In a fiery March speech that referenced 18th century Russian Orthodox saint Admiral Fyodor Ushakov, Vladimir Putin added holy war to the long list of justifications for his assault on Ukraine.[1] Even to those paying close attention, the Kremlin’s official narratives are hard to follow. Considering Ukraine’s deft maneuver in the information space, many in the West are tempted to dismiss what Putin is doing there as almost absurd—but they should not.[2]

Though hyperbolic or even outright false, Moscow’s tropes are gaining traction, and not just in nationalist cliques orbiting Moscow and St. Petersburg.[3] Much in the same way Putin’s invasion of his neighbor took most by surprise, a lack of appreciation for how these sentiments might mature could set the West up for an even greater failure to deter in the future.[4] China’s growing sympathy for Kremlin narratives contributes to global truth decay and arms revisionist powers with potential justifications for military aggression.[5] The free world’s response to this malignant growth in the information environment must not be limited to that domain, because its side effects certainly will not be.

Flooding The Environment

Beginning in November 2021, Kremlin officials dismissed a mass gathering of their forces on Ukraine’s border as nothing of any consequence.[6] When Moscow sent troops into Belarus the next month, it described the movement as simply the initial phase of joint military exercises to be held in February.[7] Until the day Russia invaded on February 24, 2022, Moscow laughed off accurate White House intelligence reports of a possible assault on Kyiv.[8] Perhaps more alarming, so did most experts and commentators in Europe, Australia, and the United States, which in turn discouraged many of Ukraine’s metropolitan citizens from evacuating.[9] But Russia did invade, and thousands have died since.

In that short period, Moscow’s narratives justifying the invasion have evolved at an alarming rate. Russia’s history of disinformation is well documented, but what the world has seen over the last few months is unique in its volume.[10] Putin began by using a worn historical narrative to insist that Ukraine has no independent identity and is therefore inherently Russian, both ethnically and geographically.[11] Historians picked apart his claims, but the Kremlin’s fantasies only intensified.[12]

The ensuing deluge of allegations from the Kremlin was impressive: Ukraine is committing genocide against its ethnic Russian population; Ukraine is in possession of weapons of mass destruction and intends to use them against Russia; Ukraine’s leaders are Nazis; Ukraine is bombing its own cities and using social media influencers as actors; Ukraine staged the Bucha massacre; and perhaps the pièce de résistance, Ukraine and the United States are training infected birds in secret Cold War-era labs to wage biological warfare on Russia.[13]

Some of these Kremlin-backed narratives amount to flat out denial that Russia is doing what the world is watching it do. Like the old Jedi mind trick of Star Wars fame, Putin seeks to wave his hand and convince the world of its lying eyes. This collection of shaky conspiracy theories is unfortunately gaining credibility in some circles, and the Kremlin’s deception teams know their audiences. Tall tales are picked up by international media outlets, parroted by cooperative or even sympathetic states like China, and given a veneer of legitimacy as the world remains transfixed on the conflict, desperately seeking off ramps.[14] In addition to the Chinese Communist Party’s Global Times accusing the United States of being the “initiator of the Ukraine crisis,” some western media outlets continue to boost erroneous claims made by Kremlin officials, such as the biolab conspiracy.[15]

Growing the Mass Base

Pairing the above narratives with a bold military action that soaks up international media attention amplifies their digital signature enormously. For proof this technique works, look no further than the global media coverage of issues that only months ago were restricted to fringe European blogs or Russian state media. Millions in the west and parts of Asia now have strong opinions about Ukraine joining NATO, biolabs in Ukraine, or the alleged Nazis who control Kyiv (a caricature of the Ukrainian Army’s Azov Battalion).[16] One Arizona lawmaker, who has since been censured, Tweeted that “Zelensky is a globalist puppet for [George] Soros and the Clintons” and sanctions on Russia are “just as wrong” as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[17] Although certainly not mainstream, the existence of these beliefs is alarming.

In his writings on the foundations of Leninism and strategic leadership, Joseph Stalin stated that the object of strategy is “to gain time, to disrupt the enemy, and to accumulate forces in order to later assume the offensive.”[18] Theorists from Mao Zedong to Stalin purport that these forces can be both active and passive, the latter contributing to what they characterize as a mass base of support.[19] One of Mao’s first commands for his self-defense units was to locate and expunge enemy propaganda—the units consisted of noncombatants who shaped the information environment.[20] In 2022, we see Russian officials and their allies in Beijing doing their best to ensure sympathizers perform the same functions, as Kremlin-backed anti-American propaganda spreads throughout Asia.[21] But Russia is hardening its narrative control domestically as well.

Recent polling by the independent Moscow-based Levada Center indicates that 83% of Russian adults still support Putin’s foreign policy—a 12% increase between February and March 2022.[22] Visible manifestations of this backing in Russia often appear in the form of the “Z” invasion symbol, which has been spotted on store windows, vehicles, billboards, the sweaters of youth flash mobs, and even donned by Russian gymnast Ivan Kuliak and olympic gold medalist Angelina Melnikova.[23]

Pockets of enduring support for Moscow in parts of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East are often overlooked in English language reporting.[24] Some generals in Myanmar, for instance, have gone so far as to call Putin’s invasion “the right thing to do.”[25] Former president of South Africa Jacob Zuma still believes Putin is a “man of peace,” while certain African newspapers condemned the western world’s response to the invasion more than the invasion itself because of the crippling effect sanctions have had on the global supply chain.[26] These passive support nodes could influence the broader strategic landscape as much as NATO’s unity in the face of Russian aggression. Rest assured, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang are watching and learning.[27]

Making the Trick Stick

Intrigues swirling around Russia’s war are reminiscent of the environment that coincided with Putin’s rise to power and the Moscow apartment bombings of September 1999. Arkady Ostrovsky explained how the ambiguous circumstances surrounding the attacks set off a “desperate search for conspiracies” in which many came to believe that any event was “orchestrated by someone behind the stage.”[28] One of the first actions Putin took as prime minister was to systematically dismantle NTV, a Russian news organization that challenged his policies.[29] The eventual proliferation of online western news media throughout Russia softened this blow initially.

Yet Moscow has for some time sought to pass legislation that installs a “national Internet,” and the war in Ukraine may present the perfect opportunity for Putin to close this loophole and exert absolute control over Russia’s information architecture.[30] He has already restricted access to major social media platforms upon which millions rely for their news, forcing some clever individuals to reach Russian citizens with stories of the war through Yelp restaurant reviews.[31] The unfortunate side effect of Putin’s war and Beijing’s apparent support for it is a global bifurcation of perceptions of truth.[32] As western sanctions continue to pummel the Russian economy, the ensuing social and economic nosedive could make this fissure a key battleground for strategic shaping activities.[33]

Countermeasures

Suggested responses to disinformation generally occupy two tracks: collective solutions through policy formulation and advocacy for individual responsibility. Controversy aside, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s short-lived Disinformation Governance Board, inconveniently coined the DGB, would have had trouble producing its desired effects.[34] A federal institution charged with debunking false narratives that often rely on the assumption that federal institutions are dishonest could face challenges.[35] Any such board would likely end up validating more opinions than it persuaded. For this reason, community outreach and professional advocacy for responsible methods of seeking information remain the preferred approach to countering disinformation in liberal democracies.

Researchers at the RAND Corporation recently developed a scorecard that may be of some use in this regard.[36] The device uses subcategories such as volume of traffic, ad content, and degree of user anonymity to assign a point system that can help educators, researchers, and individuals assess the likelihood that they are being subjected to malign propaganda narratives. Potential software solutions exist as well. Examples include automated content authenticity tools that assist in countering online propaganda, such as those developed by VAST-OSINT CEO Doowan Lee.[37] Policies aimed at the defense and intelligence communities, which are at times tasked to go on the offense in the information environment, demand more concrete reforms.

The initial fact sheet for the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy emphasizes improving the Pentagon’s resilience and response to non-kinetic threats and disruptive activities.[38] According to Gen. Richard Clark, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), his organization still lacks the tools and funding required to “push back inside the information space.”[39] Policy options for pursuing these priorities include the creation of an information warfare directorate in the National Security Council, inserting language into National Defense Authorization Acts that expands authorities related to information warfare and irregular warfare activities, and reassessing limitations placed on the intelligence community’s interagency cooperation in the information space through Executive Order 12333.[40]

Where Truth Decay Ends

Considering the above suggestions, it is important to remember that truth decay is simply a means to what are often violent ends. These means are a force multiplier that generate combat power in domains external to the information environment. As first-hand accounts from Ukraine indicate, Russia’s stranglehold on information is one of the last mechanisms propping up the fighting spirit of its army—however beleaguered that spirit may be.[41]

The war on Ukraine has rightly triggered a flood of calls for a return to stronger conventional defense in the United States and even among NATO members that have historically been soft on military spending.[42] I have made such arguments, as have scholars and practitioners such as Matthew Kroenig, Mark Gunzinger, and John Tirpak.[43] On its face, the Pentagon’s proposed 2023 budget of $773 billion appears massive, but when adjusted for inflation it is on par with budgets of the 1990s, a time when the average American could not call to mind a single foreign policy concern.[44] Today the concerns are many, competitors’ budgets are often larger than they appear, and the Pentagon has an ever-widening list of modernization initiatives to prioritize.[45]

Regarding NATO allies, as Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas made clear, spending 2% of GDP on defense must be “an absolute minimum requirement” for membership.[46] Further research is needed to determine how much of this spending should be allocated to building resilience to non-kinetic threats, and to placing allied defense and intelligence agencies into a more aggressive posture in the information environment.

In Conclusion

Moscow’s falsehoods justifying imperial aggression and war crimes have penetrated cultural and geographic boundaries. It is only a matter of time before other authoritarian powers adopt similar tactics to excuse similar actions. To address this challenge, the United States and its allies should come to view truth decay as a multi-domain mechanism for shaping the operational environment to accommodate military aggression—a non-kinetic means to a kinetic end.

The United States must build and maintain the ability to blunt not merely harmful narratives but also their physical manifestations, which, as we have seen, can take the form of war quite rapidly and unexpectedly. This might require improving individual best practices for seeking and validating information, structural policy reforms, or even increases to defense budgets. A tall order, no doubt, but if the last few months are not enough to wake the world from its post-Cold War dream of eternal peace between major powers, one shudders to think what will.

Michael P. Ferguson is an officer in the U.S. Army with operational experience throughout Europe, Africa, and Central Asia. He holds a Master of Science in Homeland Security from San Diego State University. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Vladimir Putin, 2018 (Wikimedia)

Notes:

[1] “Putin Vows Russia Will Prevail in Ukraine but Glitch Hinders TV,” Reuters, 18 March 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-hails-russias-special-operation-ukraine-thousands-packed-stadium-2022-03-18/.

[2] Charlie Warzel, “The Information War Isn’t Over Yet,” The Atlantic, 8 March 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2022/03/russia-ukraine-war-propaganda/626975/; For further reading on Russia’s dizzying post-truth world, see: Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia (New York: Public Affairs, 2015).

[3] Jeff Seldin, “US Fears Russian Disinformation About Ukraine Bioweapons Gaining Traction,” Voice of America News, 10 March 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-fears-russian-disinformation-about-ukraine-bioweapons-gaining-traction-/6479764.html; One of Russia’s most influential troll farms is headquartered in St. Petersburg, where paid internet trolls earn about $430 a month to comment on and boost pro-Kremlin videos and narratives. David Gilbert, “Inside Cyber Front Z, the ‘People’s Movement’ Spreading Russian Propaganda,” Vice News, 4 April 2022, https://www.vice.com/en/article/7kbjny/russia-cyber-front-z-telegram.

[4] Keir Giles, “Putin Does Not Need to Invade Ukraine to Get His Way,” Chatham House, 21 December 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/12/putin-does-not-need-invade-ukraine-get-his-way.

[5] Chris Buckley, “Bristling Against the West, China Rallies Domestic Sympathy for Russia,” New York Times, 4 April 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/04/world/asia/china-russia-ukraine.html; The notion of truth decay, introduced in 2018 by RAND scientists, is a product of societal information overload and the resulting decreased trust in objective truth: Luke J. Matthews, et al., “Individual Differences in Resistance to Truth Decay,” RAND Corporation, 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA112-17.html. 

[6] Paul D. Shinkman, “Putin Spokesman: Russia Won’t Invade Ukraine – Unless it’s ‘Provoked’,” US News & World Report, 23 November 2021, https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2021-11-23/putin-spokesman-russia-wont-invade-ukraine-unless-its-provoked.

[7] Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia, Belarus to Hold Joint War Games Early Next Year,” ABC News, 29 December 2021, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/russia-belarus-hold-joint-war-games-early-year-81987893.

[8] Less than ten days before the invasion, Russian citizens and officials mocked the idea. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russians Scoff at Western Fears of Ukraine Invasion,” Associated Press, 15 February 2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-colin-powell-joe-biden-business-vladimir-putin-d9246bee4d6aee4fdd27aa9e1e738f0c.

[9] Harlan Ullman, “Why Putin Won’t Invade Ukraine,” The Atlantic Council, 16 February 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-putin-wont-invade-ukraine/; Harun Yilmaz, “No, Russia Will Not Invade Ukraine,” Al Jazeera, 9 February 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/2/9/no-russia-will-not-invade-ukraine; Frank Gardner, “Ukraine Crisis: Five Reasons Why Putin Might Not Invade,” BBC, 21 February 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60468264; Sara Meger, “Why Russia Isn’t About to Invade Ukraine Soon,” Pursuit, 15 February 2022, https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/why-russia-isn-t-about-to-invade-ukraine-soon.

[10] Some researchers call this technique a “firehose of falsehood”: Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model,” RAND Corporation, 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html; For a brief history of Russian disinformation see: Michael P. Ferguson, “Welcome to the Disinformation Game: You’re Late,” The Strategy Bridge, 29 August 2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/8/29/welcome-to-the-disinformation-gameyoure-late; Michael P. Ferguson, “The Evolution of Disinformation: How Public Opinion Became Proxy,” The Strategy Bridge,

[11] Michael P. Ferguson, “Europe’s Gordian Knot,” The Hill, 19 February 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/594926-europes-gordian-knot.

[12] Timothy Snyder, “Kyiv’s Ancient Normality (redux),” Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 25 February 2022, https://huri.harvard.edu/news/timothy-snyder-kyivs-ancient-normality-redux; Mikio Sugeno, “Czar Vladimir Putin is Divorced from Reality: Niall Ferguson,” Nikkei Asia, 12 March 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/Czar-Vladimir-Putin-is-divorced-from-reality-Niall-Ferguson.

[13] Emma Farge, “Russia Says ‘Real Danger’ of Ukraine Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Required Response,” Reuters, 1 March 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/russias-lavrov-says-there-is-danger-ukraine-acquiring-nuclear-weapons-2022-03-01/; Anton Troianovski, “Why Vladimir Putin Invokes Nazis to Justify His Invasion of Ukraine,” New York Times, 17 March 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/17/world/europe/ukraine-putin-nazis.html; James Clayton & Shayan Sardarizadeh, “Twitter Blocks Russian Claims on Hospital Attack,” BBC, 10 March 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60700642; Andrew Curry, “’The Russians Must Know it’s a Lie.’ Ukrainian Bat Research Spun into a False Tale of Bioweapons,” Science Insider, 16 March 2022, https://www.science.org/content/article/russians-must-know-it-s-lie-ukrainian-bat-research-spun-false-tale-bioweapons; Daniel Villarreal, “Russian Conspiracy Theory Says U.S. Training Birds to Spread Bio Weapons,” Newsweek, 11 March 2022, https://www.newsweek.com/russian-conspiracy-theory-says-us-training-birds-spread-bio-weapons-1687399.

[14] The Middle East is not excluded from this deluge of Russian narratives: Nadia Oweidat, “The Russian Propaganda in Arabic Hidden From the West,” The Washington Institute, 18 April 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/russian-propaganda-arabic-hidden-west.

[15] Christopher Hutton, “Chinese Media Promote Kremlin Claims that Bucha Massacre was Faked,” Washington Examiner, 6 April 2022, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/chinese-media-promote-kremlin-claims-that-bucha-massacre-was-faked; Justin Ling, “How U.S. Bioweapons in Ukraine Became Russia’s New Big Lie,” Foreign Policy, 10 March 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/10/bioweapons-ukraine-russia-disinformation/.

[16] Elizabeth Dwoskin, “China is Russia’s Most Powerful Weapon for Information Warfare,” Washington Post, 8 April 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/04/08/russia-china-disinformation/; Konstantin Toropin, “Army Officer Tulsi Gabbard Faces Ire for Peddling Russian Disinformation About Ukraine Biolabs,” Military.com, 14 March 2022, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/03/14/army-officer-tulsi-gabbard-faces-ire-peddling-russian-disinformation-about-ukraine-biolabs.html.

[17] Ken Meyer, “Arizona Lawmaker Calls Zelensky ‘A Globalist Puppet for Soros and the Clintons’ in Positively Deranged Tweetstorm,” Mediaite, 27 February 2022, https://www.mediaite.com/weird/arizona-lawmaker-calls-zelensky-a-globalist-puppet-for-soros-and-the-clintons-in-positively-deranged-tweetstorm/.

[18] Joseph V. Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism (Peking, China: Foreign Language Press, 1975), 85.

[19] Mao Tse-Tung, Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961), 71-73; Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, 86-87.

[20] Mao, Guerrilla Warfare, 80.

[21] Sarah Cook, “The CCP’s Ukraine War Propaganda,” The Diplomat, 16 April 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/the-ccps-ukraine-war-propaganda/; Doug Klain, “Putin’s Generation Z: Kremlin Pro-War Propaganda Targets Young Russians,” The Atlantic Council, 18 April 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-generation-z-kremlin-pro-war-propaganda-targets-young-russians/.

[22] Derek Saul, “Putin’s Domestic Approval Reaches Highest Level in Five Years,” Forbes, 31 March 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/dereksaul/2022/03/31/putins-domestic-approval-rating-reaches-highest-level-in-five-years/.  

[23] Robert Coalson, “Special Operation Z: Moscow’s Pro-War Symbol Conquers Russia – And Sets Alarm Bells Ringing,” Radio Free Europe, 17 March 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-letter-z-fascist-symbol/31758267.html; Kuliak sported the “Z” on his uniform during a medaling ceremony in March while Melnikova held the symbol at Russia’s Victory Day Parade in April. Melnikova took gold at the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. Meredith Cash, “A Russian Gymnastics Gold Medalist Posed with the Pro-War ‘Z’ Symbol at Russia’s Victory Day Parade,” Yahoo News, 9 May 2022, https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/russian-gymnastics-gold-medalist-posed-150553192.html.

[24] Amr Hamzawy, et al., “What the Russian War in Ukraine Means for the Middle East,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 24 March 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/24/what-russian-war-in-ukraine-means-for-middle-east-pub-86711.

[25] Sui Lee Wee, Emily Shmall, and Sameer Yasir, “‘We Are On Our Side’: Across Asia, A Mixed Reaction to Ukraine War,” New York Times, 4 March 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/asia/asia-russia-ukraine-war.html.

[26] “Zuma Backs Russia Once Again, Calling Putin ‘a Man of Peace’,” The Times of Africa, 7 March 2022, https://thetimesofafrica.com/zuma-backs-russia-once-again-calling-putin-a-man-of-peace/.

[27] David Sacks, “What Is China Learning From Russia’s War in Ukraine?” Foreign Affairs, 16 May 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-16/what-china-learning-russias-war-ukraine.

[28] Although Moscow blamed the bombings on Chechen terrorists no one ever took credit for them, and the FSB’s involvement in a “civil defense exercise” involving allegedly fake bombs at the same time has led many to question the Kremlin’s narrative. Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: From Gorbachev’s Freedom to Putin’s War (New York: Viking Press, 2015), 257-258.

[29] Ibid., 262.

[30] Walter Laqueur, Putinism: Russia and its Future with the West (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 153-154.

[31] Adam Satariano and Valerie Hopkins, “Russia, Blocked From the Global Internet, Plunges Into Digital Isolation,” New York Times, 7 March 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/07/technology/russia-ukraine-internet-isolation.html; Jacob Gronholt-pedersen, “Keyboard Army Using Restaurant Review to Take on Russian State Media,” Reuters, 3 March 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/keyboard-army-using-restaurant-reviews-take-russian-state-media-2022-03-02/.

[32] Anastasia Kapetas, “Russia May Be Winning the Ukraine Information War Outside the West,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 8 April 2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russia-may-be-winning-the-ukraine-information-war-outside-the-west/; Carl Miller, “Who’s Behind #IStandWithPutin?” The Atlantic, 5 April 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/04/russian-propaganda-zelensky-information-war/629475/.

[33] Rayhan Demytrie, “Russia Faces Brain Drain as Thousands Flee Abroad,” BBC News, 13 March 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60697763.

[34] The DGB’s director, Nina Jankowicz, resigned amid controversy just three weeks after the board was announced. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Portman Expresses Concern About Creation of DHS Disinformation Governance Board, 28 April 2022, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/minority-media/portman-expresses-concern-about-creation-of-dhs-disinformation-governance-board.

[35] Sam Adler-Bell, “The Liberal Obsession With ‘Disinformation’ is Not Helping,” New York Magazine, 20 May 2022, https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2022/05/the-liberal-obsession-with-disinformation-is-not-helping.html; Anna Romandash, “Russian Propaganda is Affecting You More Than You Think,” Nonovic Institute for European Studies, 19 April 2022, https://nanovic.nd.edu/news/russian-propaganda-is-affecting-you-more-than-you-think/.

[36] Heather J. Williams, et al., “The Online Extremist Ecosystem,” RAND Corporation, December 2021, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1458-1.html.

[37] “Doowan Lee,” Institute for Security and Technology, 2022, https://securityandtechnology.org/team/info-environment-experts/doowan-lee/.

[38] Department of Defense, Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF.

[39] Todd South, “Special Ops Leader Issues Warning Over Information Warfare Capabilities, Funding,” Army Times, 17 May 2022, https://www.armytimes.com/information-warfare/2022/05/17/special-ops-leader-issues-warning-over-information-warfare-capabilities-funding/.

[40] Peter Wilcox, “The United States National Security Council Needs an Information Warfare Directorate,” The Strategy Bridge, 3 December 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/12/3/the-united-states-national-security-council-needs-an-information-warfare-directorate.

[41] Peter Pomerantsev, “’We Can only Be Enemies’,” The Atlantic, 1 May 2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/putin-war-propaganda-russian-support/629714/

[42] Bojan Pancevski, “Germany to Raise Defense Spending Above 2% of GDP in Response to Ukraine War,” Wall Street Journal, 27 February 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/germany-to-raise-defense-spending-above-2-of-gdp-11645959425.

[43] Michael P. Ferguson, “Sun-Tzu’s Trap: The Illusion of Perpetual Competition,” The Modern War Institute, 10 February 2022, https://mwi.usma.edu/sun-tzus-trap-the-illusion-of-perpetual-competition/; Matthew Kroenig, “Washington Must Prepare for War with Both Russia and China,” Foreign Policy, 18 February 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/18/us-russia-china-war-nato-quadrilateral-security-dialogue/; Mark Gunzinger and Kamilla Gunzinger, “Ukraine Makes Clear the US Must Reconsider its One-War Defense Strategy, Defense News, 14 March 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/03/14/ukraine-makes-clear-the-us-must-reconsider-its-one-war-defense-strategy/; John A. Tirpak, “Next National Defense Strategy Should Return to Two-War Force Construct,” Air Force Magazine, 15 June 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/next-national-defense-strategy-should-return-to-two-war-force-construct/.

[44] Polls in the last decade of the 20th century found that most Americans responded with “don’t know” when asked to cite a foreign policy issue facing the United States: Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 148-149; For U.S. defense budget analysis see: Editorial Board, “America’s Declining Military,” Wall Street Journal, 29 March 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-declining-military-biden-defense-budget-white-house-china-russia-military-pentagon-11648588522.

[45] Michael Kofman and Richard Connolly, “Why Russian Military Expenditure is Much Higher than Commonly Understood (as is China’s),” War on the Rocks, 16 December 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/why-russian-military-expenditure-is-much-higher-than-commonly-understood-as-is-chinas/.

[46] This is long overdue. Alliance members agreed to reach a 2% defense spending minimum by 2024 at the 2016 NATO conference. As of 2021, only 10 of its then 30 members had done so. “Kallas at NATO Summit: Estonia Needs NATO Division and Air Defence,” The Republic of Estonia, 24 March 2022, https://www.valitsus.ee/en/news/kallas-nato-summit-estonia-needs-nato-division-and-air-defence; “Brussels Summit Declaration,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 11 July 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.