In February 2014, unmarked militia groups began appearing across the Crimean Peninsula.  Later dubbed “little green men” by news outlets, these groups were a mixture of Russian conventional and special forces deployed by Russian President Vladimir Putin to relink the territory with the Russian Federation following the abdication of interim Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.[1] When coupled with the subsequent March 2014 breakaway of the Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, 2015 intervention in Syria, and interference in the American 2016 presidential election, Russia seemed to have perfected a new method of war: hybrid warfare, a political strategy that uses an array of national capabilities to conduct actions both above and below the traditional threshold of war.[2]  These actions are, in sum, designed to allow Russia to achieve strategic goals against competitors and other actors ill-prepared for such methods.

Yet, the events of February 2022 challenge such an assertion. Supposedly formidable Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) intelligence networks largely bungled pre-invasion operations, while previously successful influence campaigns have struggled to sway Western resolve.[3] In contrast, the United States has helped lead a coalition of more than 40 countries to supply both military and economic aid to Ukraine, impose multiple sanctions packages on the Russian Federation, and roll up Russian intelligence networks across Europe.[4]

The Russian Hybrid Threat Was a Product of Its Time

In truth, much of the post-2014 fear of Russian hybrid warfare strategies was predicated on the opportune conglomeration of fortuitous circumstances and opponent weaknesses in Russian targeted areas, perfectly exemplified by the infamous opening salvo of Russian modern adventurism: the seizure of Crimea. This was a risky venture, but one aimed at almost the ideal target: a geographically and politically isolated bastion with significant Russian minority populations, already hosting Russian conventional and special operations forces easily supplied and reinforced by uncontested shipping lanes.[5] In contrast, in eastern Ukraine two months later, quickly mobilized local security forces, volunteer militia groups, and conventional armed forces nearly routed separatist militias attempting to cleave the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts from Ukrainian control. Only the Russian intervention with limited conventional forces prevented a catastrophic defeat of the separatist movement.[6] Though the 2015 Minsk II agreement marked a demonstrative final Russian success in securing special recognition for the two oblasts, such a settlement was secured following the reluctant and haphazard commitment of conventional Russian forces rather than the success of some masterful hybrid strategy, a fact largely lost on Western observers.[7]

Similarly, in Syria, a hellish civil war provided easy access for Russian intervention.[8] Unlike the diverse rebel and terrorist groups that lacked the ability to overthrow the Syrian state and the haphazard mission creep of an American intervention that attempted to balance multiple conflicting partners, goals, and strategies, Russian military power, tightly concentrated, accomplished great change.[9] Uncontested Russian airpower first stabilized the battlefield, preventing the collapse of the Syrian Army.[10] The Syrian army was then backfilled by Russian equipment and advisors and augmented with private military contractors, Hezbollah militia, and Iranian Revolutionary Guard cadre, before recapturing all land not protected by either Turkish ground troops or American-supported Kurdish militias.[11] This outcome not only saved the Syrian regime, it allowed Moscow to interject itself as a player in larger Middle Eastern diplomacy, a success magnified by a comparatively weak opposition and bumbling American quasi-intervention.[12]

In the United States, the Russians encountered a similar near-perfect scenario during the 2016 presidential election. Social media companies, the American public, and political establishment were all unprepared for such state-sponsored interference.[13] Even more critically, when various intelligence agencies detected and reported such actions, their reports were viewed as attempts to sway the ongoing election for one candidate, not an honest reporting of an adversarial campaign, thereby weakening any American defensive measures.[14] While it remains and will likely remain unknown if such actions successfully changed any voter preferences, the chaos sown throughout the process marked its own success, a success made even more dramatic by the subsequent four years of controversial congressional investigations and other elections.[15] Again, where Russian action had some degree of success, opponent weakness, and missteps provided further opportunity. American reactions proved far more successful in creating a Russian narrative of success than the Russian actions themselves.

Ukraine as a Mold-breaker

While scholars of Russia will contend that hybrid warfare is the Western description for any Russian strategic action from 2014 onwards, it is useful when comparing previous Russian interventions and the 2022 escalation.[16] Thanks to proactive U.S. intelligence gathering and unprecedented intelligence sharing, even before tanks crossed the border, previous Russian advantages in surprise and opponent disarray were under challenge.[17] Intensive FSB external disinformation actions were failing, as were preparatory operations in Ukraine. The buildup of invasion forces had allowed the U.S. to challenge any Russian invasion and build an array of response measures amongst NATO, the European Union, and additional Western partners.[18] The coming Russo-Ukrainian War would not only provide a glimpse of modern conventional warfare, but also of a modern geopolitical rivalry between two near-peer adversaries. Russia would abandon any theoretically masterful hybrid strategy for a conventional invasion while the response of the United States would be shaped by what the 2017 National Security Strategy identified as great-power competition.[19]

Ukraine as Sea Change and Truth Teller

It could be argued that analyzing great-power competition in the context of a war in which one competitor is not engaged militarily limits the ability to truly assess Russian-U.S. competitive actions. Yet, great-power competition is defined by both direct and indirect confrontation between nations.[20] During the Cold War, America’s last period of great-power competition, both the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other directly and through a host of states and conflicts around the world.

Though the Russian Federation’s abilities to compete with the United States and partners have been severely weakened, Moscow still retains disruptive capability. Russia’s long term degradation is heavily contingent on the outcome of the war. Though the FSB misread Ukrainian will and capability, it was fully prepared to rapidly execute Ukrainian intelligentsia and install pro-Russian officials with the help of conventional and police forces.[21] Furthermore the FSB, along with Russian influence networks, has not sat still, capitalizing on the increasing array of alternative media and social media outlets to continue to promote disinformation and campaign against continuing Western support to Ukraine.[22] Additionally, hopes that Russia has been isolated by the array of Western imposed sanctions may be premature. Only thirty countries have sanctioned Russia, while Russia has worked feverishly to both minimize and evade targeted sanctions through increasing trade with non-sanction compliant states. Yet, such actions may not be enough. The loss of the initial narrative has placed Russia on the back foot, and, while it may still eke out an acceptable stalemate, it will be far short of complete control of Ukraine. Still, any result short of total Russian defeat would only speed Russian recovery and encourage further adventurism. 

In contrast, the United States has been demonstratively strengthened. The decision to declassify U.S. intelligence reports and build a pre-emptive coalition has paid enormous dividends in securing additional military and economic aid to Ukraine.[23] Simultaneously, the Russian invasion has not only revitalized NATO, but convinced Finland and Sweden, states previously eschewing NATO membership, to join the NATO alliance.[24] The U.S. and others have expelled Russian diplomats and rolled up intelligence networks, increased support of targeted Russian states such as Moldova, helped Europe weather the suspension of Russian oil and gas, and promoted long term energy independence.[25] These actions will further degrade Russian future competitive abilities. Finally, the United States has the benefit of using the ongoing Ukraine conflict as a testing ground for newly employed great-power competition strategies. It is worth remembering that, for the United States, great-power competition as a focal point of national strategy is only six years old.[26] From diplomatic strategies to military capabilities, the U.S. is actively taking lessons from the current conflict and evolving for future challenges, at a financial cost of less than 6% of the annual U.S. defense budget.[27]  

Conclusion: Into the Unknown

The pre-February 2022 belief that Russia was uniquely capable of employing an array of national powers to achieve objectives at low cost has proven incorrect, as has the assumption that the United States both lacks the ability to contest such actions. Rather, both great powers can engage in geopolitical great-power competition to strengthen their own position and weaken their opponents. While the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, an outcome of the initial failure of Russian conventional military power, has demonstrably weakened the Russian position while strengthening the United States, only time will tell the full story of the continuing competition. After a thirty-year hiatus, both nations have now re-entered the field of global competition and begun to fight for their respective visions of global order.

Joshua Ratta is an officer in the U.S. Army. He holds a B.A. in History from Texas A&M University. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Header Image: Dawn on the Sea of Cortez, Baja California Sur, Mexico, 2018 (Chris Sabor).

Notes:

[1] Vitaly Shevchenko, “Little green men” or “Russian invaders”?” BBC, 11 March 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154.

[2] Arsalan Bilal, “Hybrid Warfare – New Threats, Complexity, and ‘Trust’ as the Antidote,” NATO Review, 30 November, 2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html.; Michael Kofman, “Russian hybrid warfare and other dark arts,” War on the Rocks, March 11, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/.

[3] Greg Miller and Catherine Belton, “Russia’s spies misread Ukraine and misled Kremlin as war loomed,” Washington Post, August 19, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/russia-fsb-intelligence-ukraine-war/; Olga Tokariuk, “A Year of Lies: Russia’s Information War Against Ukraine,” CEPA, February 21, 2023, https://cepa.org/article/a-year-of-lies-russias-information-war-against-ukraine/.

[4] Christoph Trebesch, Arianna Antezza, et. al, “The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?” (working paper, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany, February 2023); Paddy Hirsch, “Why sanctions against Russia aren’t working – yet,” NPR, December 6, 2022, https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2022/12/06/1140120485/why-the-sanctions-against-russia-arent-working-yet; Greg Miller, Souad Mekhennet, et. al, “In wake of Ukraine war, U.S. and allies are hunting down Russian spies,” Washington Post, February 17, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/02/17/russia-spies-europe-arrests/.

[5] Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholtzer, Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html, 6-20.

[6] Michael Koftman,  et al., Lessons From Russia’s Operations, 33-48.

[7] Michael Kofman, et al., Lessons From Russia’s Operations, 44, 70.

[8] Brian Katz and Nicholas Harrington, “The Military Campaign,” in Moscow’s War in Syria, ed. Seth G. Jones, Washington, DC,: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Jones_MoscowsWarinSyria_WEB_update.pdf, 22.

[9] Jason Gresh, Seth G. Jones, and Edmund Loughran, “Implications and Takeaways,” in Moscow’s War in Syria, ed. Seth G. Jones, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Jones_MoscowsWarinSyria_WEB_update.pdf, 70; Seth Jones, “Russia’s Battlefield Success in Syria: Will it Be a Pyrrhic Victory?,” CTC Sentinel, vol 12, issue 9 (October 2019): 1-2, 5, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/russias-battlefield-success-syria-will-pyrrhic-victory/; Michael Weiss, “Syrian Rebels Backing Out of U.S. Fight Vs. ISIS,” Daily Beast, April 14, 2017, https://www.thedailybeast.com/exclusive-syrian-rebels-backing-out-of-us-fight-vs-isis.

[10] Seth G. Jones, “Russian Goals and Strategy,” in Moscow’s War in Syria, ed. Seth G. Jones, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Jones_MoscowsWarinSyria_WEB_update.pdf, 10-13; Brian Katz and Nicholas Harrington, “The Military Campaign,” 19; Seth Jones, “Russia’s Battlefield Success in Syria,” 3, 5.

[11] Brian Katz and Nicholas Harrington, “The Military Campaign,” 21-40; Jason Gresh, Seth G. Jones, and Edmund Loughran, “Implications and Takeaways,”66-67; Seth Jones, “Russia’s Battlefield Success in Syria,” 3, 5.

[12] Jason Gresh, Seth G. Jones, and Edmund Loughran, “Implications and Takeaways,” 68-69; Seth Jones, “Russia’s Battlefield Success in Syria,” 1.

[13] Tony Romm and Craig Timberg, “Facebook and Twitter testified before Congress.  Conservative conspiracy theorists lurked behind them,” Washington Post, September 5, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/09/05/facebook-twitter-sandberg-dorsey-congress-tech-hearings/; Abigail Abrams, “ Here’s What We Know So Far About Russia’s 2016 Meddling,” Time Magazine, April 18, 2019, https://time.com/5565991/russia-influence-2016-election/.

[14] Philip Ewing, “Fact Check: Why Didn’t Obama Stop Russia’s Election Interference in 2016,” NPR, February 21, 2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/02/21/587614043/fact-check-why-didnt-obama-stop-russia-s-election-interference-in-2016.

[15] Reuters, “Factbox – Key quotes from Congress’ hearing on Russia and the U.S. election,” March 20, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-trump-russia-factbox-idAFKBN16R2J9.

[16] Michael Kofman, “Russian hybrid warfare and other dark arts,”

[17] CNBC, “U.S. intel accurately predicted Russia’s invasion plans.  Did it matter?” February 25, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/25/us-intel-predicted-russias-invasion-plans-did-it-matter.html.

[18] Phil Mattingly, “Inside the Biden Administration’s monthslong effort to build a multi-country coalition to sanction Russia,” KDRV, February 26, 2022, https://www.kdrv.com/news/inside-the-biden-administrations-monthslong-effort-to-build-a-multi-country-coalition-to-sanction-russia/article_2c1c2921-4903-5402-b334-5f7a1c98f0bd.html; Greg Miller and Catherine Belton, “Russia’s spies misread Ukraine and misled Kremlin as war loomed”; Zach Dorman, “In new front of information war, U.S. repeatedly declassifies intelligence on Ukraine and Russia,” Yahoo!news, February 19, 2022, https://news.yahoo.com/in-new-front-of-information-war-us-repeatedly-declassifies-intelligence-on-ukraine-and-russia-224649617.html.

[19] White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 27, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[20] Alexander Boroff, “What is great-power competition anyway?” Modern War Institute, April 17, 2020, https://mwi.usma.edu/great-power-competition-anyway/; Nathan Jennings, Amos Fox, and Adam Taliaferro, “The US Army is wrong on future war,” Modern War Institute, December 18, 2018, https://mwi.usma.edu/us-army-wrong-future-war/.

[21] Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Walting, Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds, “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February-July 2022,” Royal United Services Institute, November 30, 2022, https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf, 10-12.

[22] Shannon Bond, “How Russia is losing – and winning – the information war in Ukraine,” NPR, February 28, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/02/28/1159712623/how-russia-is-losing-and-winning-the-information-war-in-ukraine; Christoph Trebesch, Arianna Antezza, et. al, “The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?”; Paddy Hirsch, “Why sanctions against Russia aren’t working – yet.”

[23] Phil Mattingly, “Inside the Biden Administration’s months long effort to build a multi-country coalition to sanction Russia.”

[24] “Jonathan Guyer, “NATO was in crises.  Putin’s war machine made it even more powerful,” Vox, March 25, 2022, https://www.vox.com/22994826/nato-resurgence-biden-trip-putin-ukraine; Phelen Chatterjee, “Sweden and Finland’s journey from neutral to NATO, BBC, 29 June 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478.

[25] Greg Miller, Souad Mekhennet, et. al, “In wake of Ukraine war, U.S. and allies are hunting down Russian spies.”; Ben Lefebvre, “How American energy helped Europe best Putin, Politico, February 23, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/23/american-energy-europe-putin-00083750; Steve Holland and Doina Chiacu, “US to help Moldova fight Russia’s destabilization efforts, Reuters, March 10, 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/23/american-energy-europe-putin-00083750.

[26] White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 27.

[27] Timothy Ash, “It’s Costing Peanuts for the US to Defeat Russia, CEPA, November 18, 2022, https://cepa.org/article/its-costing-peanuts-for-the-us-to-defeat-russia/.