"Monday Musings” are designed to get quick, insightful thoughts based around three questions from those interested in strategy, from the most experienced and lauded, to our newest thinkers/writers.
In Defense of Programs: Surviving The Drawdown
The drawdown is upon us. Both the base budget and the overseas contingency operation funding lines are getting smaller. This is forcing Department of Defense (DoD) components to make hard decisions on which programs they want to fund. These hard decisions are informed and influenced by the efforts of strategists, cost assessors, budgeters, congressional affairs personnel, program evaluators, and others who do similar work. If DoD components want to survive, and possibly thrive during a drawdown, they need to invest in and reward the work of strategists, cost assessors, budgeters, congressional affairs personnel, and program evaluators as they are DoD’s Program Defenders.
Fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
My Take: Authorization for Use of Military Force
The debate regarding an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is in the forefront of the media this week. Since I began blogging in September of last year, I have written an assessment of the threat ISIL poses to the United States, suggested that foreign policy regarding ISIL be focused on behavior vice group name, and advocated for Congress to establish a strategic planning requirement when the men and women of our Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities. Below is my AUMF for ISIL, reflecting ideas established and refined in previous blog posts, overlayed onto how I think the U.S. should participate in this fight.
Below is my AUMF for ISIL, reflecting ideas established and refined in previous blog posts, overlayed onto how I think the U.S. should participate in this fight.
To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria.
Whereas the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria are committing daily acts of barbarity, pose a threat to the United States and the international community, and to support United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2169 (2014) and 2170 (2014), therefore be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:
JOINT RESOLUTION
To authorize use of the United States Armed Forces against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This joint resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Authorization for Use of Military Force against the Violent Extremist Groups and Individuals Seeking to Establish an Independent State within the Territorial Limits of Iraq and Syria.”
SECTION 2. REPEAL OF AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ
The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–243; 116 Stat. 1498; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) is hereby repealed.
SECTION 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES
(a) AUTHORIZATION. The President is authorized, as part of a multinational coalition, subject to the limitations in subsection (c), to use the United States Armed Forces against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria.
(b) EXPIRATION. The authorization in this section shall expire on the date that is three years after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution.
(c) LIMITATIONS.
(1) The authority granted in subsection (a) does not authorize use of the United States Armed Forces in direct ground combat in except as necessary for the protection or rescue of United States military members and executive branch employees and contractors, or United States citizens, from imminent danger posed by the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria.
(2) The authority granted in subsection (a) does not authorize the United States Armed Forces to accompany any force or individual, on the ground, engaged in direct ground combat against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria.
(3) The authority granted in subsection (a) does not authorize the physical presence of the United States Armed Forces inside Syria except to conduct offensive air operations against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria or to rescue isolated personnel involved in activities against the same.
(d) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.
(1) Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1547(a)(1)), Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)) within the limits of the authorization established under this section.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS. Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.).
SECTION 4. REPORTS
(a) PERIODIC REPORT. The President shall report to Congress at least once every 60 days on specific actions taken pursuant to this authorization.
(b) COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution, the President shall submit to Congress an unclassified report, which may include a classified annex, on the comprehensive strategy to address the threat posed by the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria. This comprehensive strategy shall be presented in a manner similar to the agency strategic planning requirements established in section 306 of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–352).
SECTION 5. DEFINITIONS
(a) Violent Extremist means someone who uses violence to further ideas that are very far from what most people consider correct or reasonable.
(b) Direct Ground Combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with individual and crew served weapons while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel.
(c) Isolated Personnel are United States military members and executive branch employees and contractors, United States citizens, or multinational coalition personnel who are separated from their unit (as an individual or a group) while participating in an activity against groups and individuals using violent extremism to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria, and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape.
SECTION 6. APPLICABILITY
The President’s authority to use the United States Armed Forces against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria is wholly contained within this joint resolution.
Phil Walter has served in the military, the intelligence community, and the inter-agency. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not contain information of an official nature. He tweets @philwalter1058 and blogs at www.philwalter1058.com.
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An Enduring Framework for United States National Security
The success of this enduring framework in guiding national security activities across multiple Presidential administrations hangs ultimately on the recognition and acceptance of its value by the Executive Branch, Congress, and the citizens of the United States. The reward is freedom and democracy in the United States for generations to come. Failure means total defeat at the hands of the Opposition. The execution of national security activities under this enduring framework will require ingenuity, sacrifice, and the tenacity to persevere in a free society where there is never total victory, since freedom and democracy are always in the process of being attained.
Effective Communication in “The Non-Expert Zone”
You are a subject matter expert within an organization. You have identified a problem. You have a plan to remedy it. Your plan requires additional funding, equipment, or authority; a waiver, change, or addition to an existing policy; or change or addition to law. As you brief your plan to higher levels within your organization on your way to the person with approval authority, it is likely that your audience does not share your knowledge, experience, or subject matter expertise.
You have now entered the Non-Expert Zone.
In most organizations, when leaders get promoted, their responsibility increases. This increased responsibility often forces that leader to shift from focusing on a few problems in depth to the wave tops of many problems. S/he now depends upon his subordinates to go in depth on a subject, handle problems at the lowest possible level, and only bring forward problems that demand the promoted leader’s time and attention. As the subject matter expert with a problem to solve, you not only need to have a solid plan, but also know the best way to present that plan to each unique audience on the way to its approval.
Here are some considerations for tackling this problem:
Identify the stimulus for the problem.
To fully understand the stimulus, trace it as far back as you possibly can. In my experience, and to make an Army-centric example, the content of a Field Manual can sometimes be traced to a Department of Defense Directive, to an Executive Order, to a Law, and then to an event of some kind that caused Congress to act. Additionally, this tracing may lead to the discovery that the stimulus is actually caused by a narrow view of a policy or law and you can remedy the problem at a lower level.
Make your short- and long-term plans to remedy the problem.
If your plan requires additional funding, ensure you take the fiscal year budget cycle, unfunded requirements process, and future years defense program into account. If your plan requires additional equipment, identify the source as specifically as possible; examples would include where to purchase a piece of equipment, or from what organization you can take to meet your shortfalls. If your plan requires additional authority, a waiver, change, or addition to an existing policy, find out who can make that decision. If your plan requires a change or addition to law, meet with your Congressional Affairs/Legislative Affairs personnel and find out the best way forward.
Determine risk versus gain.
If the current situation remains, what is the risk? If those risks are fully or partially realized, what is the consequence? If the consequence occurs, how much time and money will be spent fixing the problem after the fact? What is the gain if the problem is fixed?
Determine your audience.
Determine who you need to brief and at what level they sit. Find out how each of those people prefers to be briefed. My first line supervisor learns best via auditory stimulus, so I use text or slides sparingly and talk a lot. My next supervisor is visual, but prefers text over graphics. Above him is a supervisor who is visual, but leans towards graphics vice text. Next up from him is a supervisor who does auditory first and then likes to see the words on paper, so I brief him verbally then hand him paperwork to review. With each of these supervisors, my use of doctrinal terms and shorthand ebbs and flows due to some of them having a military background and some not.
You should also find out what each audience values. When addressing intelligence organizations at DoD, I often tie my message to the intelligence requirements process. When working with operational organizations at DoD, I speak to the various orders and plans that drive their efforts. When speaking to foreign policy organizations, I tie my message to the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, or similar documents. When dealing with Congress, I know that the Intelligence Committees value the Intelligence Community (IC) and that I need to use IC-centric terminology when briefing them. The Armed Services Committees value the Military Departments and Combatant Commands, so I speak to supporting the warfighter when briefing them. The Appropriations Committees value how money is expended, so I use language from the Government Performance Results Act when briefing them.
Tailor your brief and rehearse.
You will now need to build different versions of your brief based upon who you are briefing, how they prefer to be briefed, and what they value. Rehearse! Rehearse! Rehearse! This includes role-playing within your organization, preferably with people that are not familiar with the issue at hand. During rehearsals, read any prepared language out loud — you will be surprised how many errors you find by doing this.
Execute your brief.
Enter the room to brief having left your ego at the door. Present your plan in an objective, dispassionate, professional manner including or discarding doctrinal terminology or shorthand based upon the audience. Answer the question asked. Do not answer the question not asked. Admit when you do not know something. Offer to find out and return with the answer. Returning with the answer gives you an opportunity to demonstrate to the audience that you heard them and took action to meet their requirement. This goes a long way towards building rapport which may contribute to approval of your plan.
When navigating the Non-Expert Zone, always remember that success is possible, but persistence is the key. Some problems take multiple years to solve. Do not give up the fight; do not let the system win. As General “Vinegar” Joe Stillwell said, “Don’t let the bastards grind you down.”
Phil Walter has served in the military, the intelligence community, and the inter-agency. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not contain information of an official nature. He tweets @philwalter1058 and blogs at
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Header image: Major Doland Johnson, 434th Wing Navigator, briefing an Airborne soldier about a jump from 434th C-119's.
A #Human Response
As the Army looks at itself and asks if it is sufficiently organized and trained to address today’s threats, so too should Congress ask itself whether the laws that define the Department of Defense and its subordinate components are sufficient, as should the White House ensure its foreign policy decisions do not violate the Ranger Handbook’s leadership principle of “Know your unit’s capabilities and limitations, and employ them accordingly.”
Anatomy of an “Intelligence Failure”
Listen closely and you can hear it. Far off in the distance an angry mob has formed and wants the heads of every intelligence organization across the United States Government on pikes. The stale mantra of “intelligence failure” and “strategic surprise” has returned. This time, the stimulus is the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which then became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and is presently called the Islamic State (IS).