In analyzing American and Russian strategic cultures, it is tempting to believe that once one determines how strategic culture shapes each nations’ preferences for decisions, one may also suppose that their strategic culture is somehow fixable. This sentiment is an intellectual dead end and entirely misses the point. Strategic culture is a package of robust variables and traits “not easily amended, let alone overturned, by acts of will.” As Gray points out, “even if you recognize some significant dysfunctionality in your strategic [culture], you may not be able to take effective corrective action.” Strategic culture’s persistence, however, does not mean it cannot or does not evolve.
President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.
