Human Fog, Human Friction, Human Chance

Clausewitz, in his seminal work On War, introduced the concepts of fog, friction, and chance. If, as Clausewitz claimed, warfare is an extension of politics by other means, and if man is a political animal, then logic concludes war at its very foundation is a uniquely human phenomenon full of these three elements. Moreover, fog, friction, and chance are critical to the centrality of violence in warfare. Fog is the uncertainty in war, friction is the countless minor incidents that make the simple very difficult, and chance is the unpredictable circumstances that consistently occur in war.

When national leaders argue for the use of land power, and the nation follows suit by employing ground forces to resolve a crisis or conflict, they are employing the most unpredictable weapon in the strategic arsenal: the human. As strategic planners and leaders make the argument for using land power to solve our nation’s problems, they have a responsibility to mention the risks land power entails. Moreover, employing “boots on the ground” should no more be recognized as a solution to the challenges born of fog, friction, and chance in warfare than the latest precision-guided munition or cyber gadget developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

The commitment of ground forces is the ultimate expression of national will; it commits time, blood, and treasure, and every measure should be considered to ensure it is not the first, nor the last resort, but the correct resort.

As described in the recently-published Army Operating Concept, American military power is indeed joint power. The decision to employ joint power should reflect the consideration of a number of factors, to include the national interest at stake (which may also include the interests of our partners) and the political risk involved. Limited ends further constrain limited means. The commitment of ground forces is the ultimate expression of national will; it commits time, blood, and treasure, and every measure should be considered to ensure it is not the first, nor the last resort, but the correct resort. Indeed, it is paramount to understand that once the nation commits major land forces to execute decisive operations, a commitment to follow on phases of an operation is sure to follow.

Moreover, when committing land forces to a conflict, one should understand that the commitment and expense might last for decades. It may be in the form of physical presence such as Iraq, Kosovo, Germany, or Japan, or in expenditures. With regard to the latter, the Department of Veterans Affairs is still providing benefits 65 years after the end of the Second World War. Battles may last days and weeks, but Post Traumatic Stress and other battle-related physical and psychological maladies will last a lifetime.

Indeed, not only does the employment of land power not guarantee a successful outcome any more than launching Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles from afar, introducing humans into the conflict carries with it its own risks to the conflict and to the nation. With every additional boot on the ground, the fog, friction, and chance in warfare increase. Humans are unpredictable.

Ultimately, the placement of soldiers or marines on the ground does not eliminate the fog of warfare.

As we can see from the past thirteen years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, when the United States puts hundreds of thousands of soldiers on the ground, outcomes at the three levels of war (tactical, operational, and strategic) become all the more unpredictable. Precision-guided close air support can be strike the wrong target and kill people attending a wedding or a funeral if that’s where its directed, just as soldiers can fire at a non-threat car approaching a checkpoint or following too closely to a convoy. Ultimately, the placement of soldiers or marines on the ground does not eliminate the fog of warfare. Moreover, as witnessed in our recent conflicts when precision-guided munitions following ground-based laser designation engage the wrong target, the problem is as much a land power issue as it is an air power issue.

According to Human Rights Watch, over the past decade in Afghanistan, instances of civilian and Afghan Security Force casualties from allied aircraft were often the outcome of allied air power responding on behalf friendly troops in contact.[1] The fog of battle applies to both air and land power in these situations; distinguishing between the two creates a false dichotomy. In other words, humans on the ground, operating with the fog and friction of warfare can lead to the terrible outcomes often attributed to air power alone.

Humans are fallible, and never more so than in war. Fallibility, however, is not always limited to the dichotomy between those who earn the Medal of Honor and war criminals.

Not only does the fog of warfare remain thick when humans are sent into conflict, but the friction created by actions of ground forces remains unmitigated. It seems war crimes occur on every battlefield, so believing every American soldier who deploys to combat will fight in an ethical manner is delusional. When making the decision to employ “boots on the ground,” leadership should honestly acknowledge the risk of war crimes, and in today’s age of social media recognize these incidents are easily broadcast for the world to see. Each of these incidents adds to the friction we must overcome to achieve our strategic objectives. Contemporary examples of this include Abu Ghraib, Nasoor Square, and Yusifiyah. For every Dakota Meyer or William Swenson, we have a Steven Green or Robert Bales whose tactical actions have dire strategic consequences. Humans are fallible, and never more so than in war. Fallibility, however, is not always limited to the dichotomy between those who earn the Medal of Honor and war criminals. Fallibility is not always a conscientious choice in war. When choosing the “boots on the ground” option as a solution to our national problems, morally ambiguous actions that lead to the scenarios of Khosrow Sofia and Tarok Kolache tend to occur.[2]

Additionally, the employment of combat power today requires more than just soldiers and marines on the ground. Under the current U.S. way of warfare, land power and the employment of forces to control land over sustained periods of time demands the use of contractors and private military firms. Again, when leadership discusses the number of “boots on the ground,” they must acknowledge these individuals. From an adversary or foreign nation point of view, the distinction between a contractor and soldier is irrelevant. S/he is a person on the ground advancing U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, when the U.S. conducts coalition operations, we assume the fog, friction, and chance that partner nation members bring into the conflict. Not only should these numbers count, but they are a factor in the overall fog, friction, and chance on the battlefield. Indeed, war crime incidents over the past fifteen years have also included contractors. Nasoor Square, Abu Ghraib, and the sexual trafficking incidents in Bosnia conducted by Dyncorps employees are but a few examples. Humans making the wrong tactical decisions in warfare often contribute in aggregate to strategic consequences. Sometimes these are a result of true malevolent intent. In other cases, these situations arise pursuant to the human condition of cognitive frailty, but regardless both exhibit the truth in the fog, friction, and chance.

War is absurd. Most everything that occurs in combat is absurd. Despite the absurdity of war, the decision to wage it must remain subordinate to rational policy. Rational policy should consider all that occurs when humans are placed into combat, regardless of where they fight in the air, land, or sea.

War is absurd. Most everything that occurs in combat is absurd. Despite the absurdity of war, the decision to wage it must remain subordinate to rational policy. Rational policy should consider all that occurs when humans are placed into combat, regardless of where they fight in the air, land, or sea. The more humans that are thrown into combat the more fallible souls there are in the conflict. The decisions of individuals involved in combat operations create fog, friction, and chance. The most accurate books on warfare are not the memoirs of retired generals such as Tommy Franks, but the fictional novels like The Naked and the Dead and Slaughterhouse Five. Each of us in combat is subject to our own faults and the baggage we carry with us into the combat zone that no amount of training will ever solve. Fallible humans create the chances for absurd scenes, be it a general officer in charge of a prison claiming she had no influence on what happened there, or the execution of a soldier for stealing a teapot in the midst of a city of ruin. War can bring out the very best, and simultaneously, the very worst in humans. The nation that opts for the use of land power in war should be prepared for both.

The employment of land forces is indeed the strongest and loudest commitment the U.S. can make to our partners and allies, and is essential when an enemy must be destroyed or a regime overthrown.

The employment of land forces is indeed the strongest and loudest commitment the U.S. can make to our partners and allies, and is essential when an enemy must be destroyed or a regime overthrown. But we must be cautious in our advancement of ideas pertaining to land power, especially that “boots on the ground” is any more a panacea to our nation’s problems than air strikes, precision-guided munitions, or even economic sanctions. No specific element of national or military power has universal application. The use of land forces should be measured against the nation’s interests and policy ends, and balanced in complement with what can be used from other domains and services. We should take good measure to know and understand that fog, friction, and chance do not end when you put boots on the ground; in fact, doing so can increase these elements, paradoxically complicating the crisis. This is not to create a dichotomy between land forces and other forms of power, but there should be a recognition that the use of land power may not apply universally, and that when it is applied it has a real cost exacerbated by fog, friction, and chance.

Strategic thinkers from Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie to Lieutenant General (retired) Daniel Bolger generally agree that to control an area or a population, you need a human on the ground with a gun. This control carries with it a compelling argument for the use of land forces. However, controlling the land or population of a foreign nation rarely lasts forever in the modern world. As Bolger wrote in his recent book, in a prolonged conflict, the home team tends to win. When Israeli Defense Forces invaded Lebanon in 1982 to root out terrorism, the subsequent occupation lasted 18 years. This period of occupation would see the rise and institutionalization of Hezbollah, an organization now solidly in control of parts of Lebanon. Moreover, the commitment of land forces by Israel created a “Catch-22.” Each instance of relative peace and calm meant ground forces were effective and required to stay to maintain security. Each instance of violence meant ground forces were required to quell the disorder. The decision to apply ground forces to a problem should consider the risk of becoming a self-licking ice cream cone. This type of experience is not unique to the State of Israel.

…the use of land forces is always messy, and should never become a panacea for American strategic thought.

The U.S. has committed land power on numerous occasions over the past century. At times, land power, as a part of all elements of national power, was committed properly. Examples here include both World Wars and Operation Desert Storm. Juxtaposed against these examples are Vietnam, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Land power can bring a quick and decisive end to a conflict, but incurs a risk of rapid escalation of a conflict creating the conditions for long-term quagmire at great cost to the nation. Recently, the United States has employed land forces to combat Ebola in West Africa and to reassure our Polish and other NATO allies when Russia invaded Ukraine. In both circumstances, land power was essential to advance American interests. On the other hand, some have argued for an increase in American land forces to combat the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL).

When President Obama defined his strategy to the nation of relying on coalition air strikes and the specific commitment of Special Forces, some criticized the strategy for not employing a decisive number of “boots on the ground” to crush ISIL. Moreover, some asserted the President did not understand the nature of warfare. But those same pundits must acknowledge the use of land forces is always messy, and should never become a panacea for American strategic thought. If the past thirteen years of war has taught policy makers anything, it is that the use land forces is the ultimate expression of political will, and placing men and women in the unforgiving and unpredictable circumstances of war is never without tradeoffs, including great cost.

---

Daniel Sukman is a strategist in the US Army, a Military Fellow at the Project for International Peace & Security (PIPS), and a member of the Military Writers Guild. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the DoD, or the U.S. Government.

---

Have a response or an idea for your own article? Follow the logo below, and you too can contribute to The Bridge:

Enjoy what you just read? Please help spread the word to new readers by sharing it on social media.

---

Notes:

[1] “Troops in Contact” Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan.” Human Rights Watch. September 2008. Accessed 17 December 2014.http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0908web_0.pdf

[2] Joshua Foust. 2011. “How Short-Term Thinking is Causing Long-Term Failure in Afghanistan.” The Atlantic. Accessed 16 December 2014.http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/01/how-short-term-thinking-is-causing-long-term-failure-in-afghanistan/70048/?single_page=true

Asymmetric Offsets

Recent publications by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) have called for the creation of a Third Offset Strategy.[1] This has led to discussions on what provides the United States advantage in warfare over our enemies and adversaries. Looking for one solution in a third offset, and as described in the first two offsets, is a false choice. Each advantage lies at the various levels of warfare.

First, it is important to recognize the historical precedents of the first and second offsets. The CSBA identifies President Eisenhower’s “New Look” defense policy focused on long-range bombers and nuclear weapons as the first offset.[2] The second offset is defined by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Under Secretary William Perry’s direction for the Department of Defense to develop stealth, precision strike weapons, and improved command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in the 1970s. The latter came into fruition during the wars in Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, and Afghanistan. While this approach has its merits, the military instrument of American national power is much broader in scope strategically, operationally, and tactically.

Today, the US military holds asymmetric advantages over our adversaries at each of the levels of warfare. For the purposes of this essay, and taking the definition from Joint Publication 1–02, asymmetric is defined as, “the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics, capabilities, and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weaknesses.”

Strategic Asymmetric Advantages: The Relationship and Partnership Offset

Maintaining proper civil-military relations enables both a strong military and enables other forms of national power. This relationship ensures a promotion system based on merit in lieu of political favors. Moreover, proper civil-military relations allows the military to focus its training and resources on fighting and winning America’s wars. The US military does not act as an internal police force, or as a means of “regime survival.” Contrasted to nations such as the former Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, or other nations whose military required an inward focus, the promotion of officers based on political connections and frequent purges of the best and brightest officers, the US has a strategic advantage in the focus and purpose of its armed forces.

Allies and partners are critical to the conduct of military operations in the 21st century. Strategically, maintaining a robust number of allies and partners is critical for the US military to impose its will on adversaries and enemies across the globe. More than just NATO, allies and partners are critical to worldwide basing of forces and equipment, as well as strategic access into zones of conflict. This strategic advantage was critical throughout the 20th century and is essential for the foreseeable future. Indeed, enemies of the US may be able to sneak an agent through customs on a commercial flight, but do not expect Iran or ISIS to stage a battalion on the US border in preparation for an invasion.

The criticality of NATO to counter the Soviet threat during the Cold War is unaccounted for in CSBA’s assessment of the first offset.

The criticality of NATO to counter the Soviet threat during the Cold War is unaccounted for in CSBA’s assessment of the first offset. It was not the fact that the US had long-range bombers and missiles that could strike the Soviet Union, rather the fact that the US was able to place these weapons on the doorstep of the Russian Bear in Western and Central Europe. Indeed Khrushchev saw medium range missiles in Turkey as a greater threat than planes and missiles in the US. Moreover, when the Soviets made use of an ally in Cuba, it was the strategic access offered by the Cubans that was seen as vital threat to US interests, more so than long-range missiles in Siberia. When the US has failed to gain allied support for a war, the consequences have been telling. When the US largely “goes it alone” as we did in Vietnam and Iraq in 2003, we were unable to attain decisive and lasting political results.

Unfortunately, the CSBA calls for a “reduced dependence on close-in theater land and sea bases.” A reduction of these bases reduces leverage and relationships built over time.

Key to allies and partners is building and maintaining relationships over time. In this aspect, the US military acts in concert with other agencies and elements of national power. For example, the Department of State is fundamental in harnessing the globe’s will (and resources) through relationships, both built over time and necessary in a crisis. History provides examples of nations who had military advantages in technology, yet failed to gain support for their cause. Any one nation can achieve success locally, but no one nation can stand against the rest of the world. The success of the allied partnerships is the foundation upon which the third off-set is constructed. Unfortunately, the CSBA calls for a “reduced dependence on close-in theater land and sea bases.”[3] A reduction of these bases reduces leverage and relationships built over time. Although overseas land and sea basis can prove to be a target of enemy and adversary anti-access and area denial systems, striking an enemy still requires overland and overflight access. Overseas bases that enhance allied and partner relationships are critical to US military global power.

The strategic advantage of allies and partners across the globe enables the advantage of global lift. Simply put, the US has the ability to transport and sustain hundreds of thousands of troops on the ground across the planet. This capability was on full display during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It may take months to put a force in place; however that force will get there and sustain operations for years if not decades. An infrastructure of long-range air and sea transport allows massive armies to engage our enemies on their home field. Examples to contrast this capability are the Soviets in Afghanistan who could not sustain an army in an adjacent country. For the preponderance of nations, the ability to operate on exterior lines of communication is null.

Nations act in accordance with their self-interests. Maintaining relationships with allies and partners is dependent upon the economic advantages of doing so. The US economy, despite the recent recession remains dominant over the rest of the world. Fueled by Bretton-Woods, the US dollar remains the sought after currency when other nation’s economies flounder. The ability of the US to impose economic costs on enemies and adversaries through means other than military power is leverage few nations enjoy. Moreover, the US economy fuels a technologically savvy industrial base upon which the military can depend. Whatever material an adversary puts on the battlefield, the US can produce more of it, at better quality, for our warfighter on the battlefield.

Operational Asymmetric Advantages: The Joint Offset

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols act passed its way through Congress to enforce a joint warfighting philosophy on the US military. Jointness is an operational advantage the US holds over its adversaries and enemies, more specifically nation states who may use a military force to oppose us. The use of Joint Force Commanders in lieu of separate service commanders ensures each service contributes to the same objectives and endstates. Moreover, a system of combatant commanders allows for the formation of operational plans that do not press for service parochialism. Throughout history, there are many examples of nations whose navy or air force’s operations were de-synched from the troops on the ground. The ability to conduct joint and combined arms operations is a distinct operational advantage.

Failing to operate jointly has had consequences in previous conflicts. Recent international conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, provides an example of how a nation’s air force or navy can operate completely independent from a nation’s land forces.[4] Moreover, failure to fight in a Joint manner has led to disastrous consequences, as displayed in the battle of Tarawa during World War II. For the US, the attempted rescue of hostages in Iran, and blue on blue casualties in Grenada and Panama. In the latter two examples, the US was fortunate to be fighting wars against arguably two of the weakest nations on earth.

The ability to operate in a joint environment allows each component in the air, maritime, and land domains to complement each other actions. Since the Korean War over 60 years ago, when a soldier or marine on the ground looks up into the air and sees an object, he or she is assured that it is a friendly aircraft. Moreover, dominance and superiority are not unique to the air domain. Eleven Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) that roam the seven seas provides a capability no other nation possesses. While the Chinese and other nations posses aircraft carriers, they do not represent the capability of a CSG. Command of the seas has been the goal of empires and nations since the time of Thucydides; the US has ended this game with a final score of 11–0.[5]

Superiority in the air and maritime domain has been and will remain a given for the US — what is and will be continued to be challenged is the US advantages in the land domain.

Superiority in the air and maritime domain has been and will remain a given for the US — what is and will be continued to be challenged is the US advantages in the land domain. As discussed by LTG H.R. McMaster in the recently published Army Operating Concept, to counter overmatch capabilities of the US, adversaries will seek to avoid US strengths, disrupt our advantages in communications, long range precision fires, and surveillance, emulate US military capabilities, and expand their operations into the US homeland.[6] Employing each component of the joint force in a synchronized manner to defeat adversaries is an advantage few nations can employ.

Tactical Asymmetric Advantages: The People and Technology Offset

At the tactical level of warfare, the US has built up asymmetric advantages at the individual level. Simply put, the US sends the very best soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines into combat. This offset is built through training, education, and leadership of our men and women in uniform and working as DoD or service civilians, as well as the technology employed against our enemies. A global surveillance and strike concept that the CBSA envisions is unattainable without investments in the right people to operate and capitalize on technological advancements and overmatch.

Leadership is fundamental to success in combat. Most nations, especially in the West, have built highly educated officer corps. The US stands apart with the development and trust of the enlisted ranks, specifically through non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Moreover, the trust, training, education, and leadership experience of our NCO Corps provides an advantage against most nations, as our NCOs are as good as, and arguably better than, officers from adversary nations. Indeed, the trust and decision making with which the US empowers our NCOs is greater than what most nations entrust their officers. Certainly, the quality of the individual in combat provides an offset to numerical advantages in an adversary. Moreover, the trust and confidence the US places in individuals at the lower echelons to operate high-level technology are unparalleled. Global surveillance and strike systems become limited in their effectiveness when those available to operate said systems are limited in supply.

The proposal by CSBA for the third offset focuses on greater use of unmanned and autonomous systems. Clearly the ability to strike an enemy at any time of our choosing is a significant advantage of the US must maintain over our adversaries, but the risks these systems entail are legion. First, enhancing the physical distance to the battlefield, and eliminating risk to humans, creates situations where the decision to go to war is easier and without a robust national dialogue. Nor are these systems a panacea to the world’s problems. It is easy to strike Yemen with drones, but they are without a national dialogue or consensus over the killing people in a foreign nation…and without decisive results.

Investing in people or technology is not a dichotomy that our nation’s leaders face. The tough choice presented is where to focus the limited resources and available funding.

Investing in people or technology is not a dichotomy that our nation’s leaders face. The tough choice presented is where to focus the limited resources and available funding. In past conflicts, such as World War I, nations invested in people rather than technology, believing the human will and spirit could overcome machine guns and entrenched defensive positions on the battlefield. Moreover, recent conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated how a false belief in the human will could overcome advanced technologies.[7] The overwhelming technological edge was on full display in both 1991 and 2003 when the US accomplished in a few short weeks what the Iranians failed to do over eight years of conflict. Investing in people over the development of technology cost millions of lives. The US, to maintain military advantages over enemies and adversaries must weigh how it will invest its capital, careful to avoid a dichotomy between people and technology. Each of these investment choices complements each other. Indeed, as those familiar with the military acquisitions process understand, material solutions alone will not win a war, rather the suite of all institutional solutions should be considered.

Conclusion

The United States enjoys asymmetrical advantages over adversaries, and has done so since our awakening on December 7th, 1941. As the US looks to the future, maintaining these advantages at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare is critical to both global security and the security interests of the US. Investments in people and the technology they employ must go hand in hand if the US chooses to maintain its global leadership role.

---

Daniel Sukman is a strategist in the US Army, a Military Fellow at the Project for International Peace & Security (PIPS), and a member of the Military Writers Guild. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the DoD, or the U.S. Government.

---

Have a response or an idea for your own article? Follow the logo below, and you too can contribute to The Bridge: 

Enjoy what you just read? Please help spread the word to new readers by sharing it on social media.

---

Notes:

[1] Martinage Robert. 2014. Toward a New Offset Strategy Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages To Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability. Center For Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

[2] ibid

[3] Ibid (page 17)

[4] Murray, Williamson and Woods, Kevin. 2014. The Iran-Iraq War ; A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

[5] Easterbrook, Gregg. 2010. “Waste Land.” The New Republic. Accessed 3 March 2015.http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/magazine/79066/waste-defense-spending-america-pentagon

[6] The United States Army Operating Concept. 2014.

[7] Murray, Williamson and Woods, Kevin. 2014. The Iran-Iraq War ; A Military and Strategic History. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.