Alessandra Nisch
Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of ...

President Putin made three foundational assumptions in launching his war against Ukraine that should have been correct but were not. First, Putin assumed the invasion of Ukraine would be a quick and easy fight. Second, he assumed the world would denounce the invasion but tacitly allow it. Third, Putin assumed the war would deter NATO expansion.

Putin’s Wars: Testing Boyd’s Strategy of Applied Friction

Army

#Reviewing An Army Afire

#Reviewing An Army Afire

An Army Afire offers lessons for leaders throughout the joint force in how to approach and solve complex and seemingly overwhelming problems. Bailey’s work is an important addition to the historical record of the U.S. military, and, more specifically, the U.S. Army. Innovative ideas and novel courses of action are necessary for combat and institutional actions. The military that fought in the 1991 Gulf War, and later in Afghanistan and Iraq were more than the product of combat platforms, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and AirLand Battle; it was a force composed of a diverse set of men and women who stood on the shoulders of those who suffered and fought to change a system of inequality.

Paying for Tomorrow’s Readiness with Today’s

Paying for Tomorrow’s Readiness with Today’s

As the ground force provider with constant missions, the United States Army has, post-WWII, attempted to maintain readiness while it modernized simultaneously and in-stride. However, the force the U.S. Army wants to field in the future is transformational and therefore requires a more deliberate approach. The U.S. Army must determine not only how and when to modernize, but also how to mitigate the cost of modernization.

Getting Past the Civil War: The Morality of Renaming U.S. Army Bases Named After Confederate Generals

Getting Past the Civil War: The Morality of Renaming U.S. Army Bases Named After Confederate Generals

One hundred-and-fifty-five years after the end of the Civil War, as the growing movement to remove memorials and monuments to Confederacy suggest, it appears Lee was right in his opposition. Moreover, whatever one believes about Lee’s decision to fight for the Confederacy, it is well past time to take his advice.

Nuclear Constraints and Concepts of Future Warfare

Nuclear Constraints and Concepts of Future Warfare

Since the United States’ near-peer adversaries possess nuclear weapons, the U.S. Army needs to prepare for small, politically constrained, ambiguous, limited conflict. Without a reorientation on the future, the U.S. Army doctrine and concepts are not useful and potentially limit policymakers’ options, or worse, risk accidental nuclear escalation.

People, Posture, and Processes: U.S. Army Sustainment Options for the Joint Force in the Pacific

People, Posture, and Processes: U.S. Army Sustainment Options for the Joint Force in the Pacific

In the midst of unassuming jobs where sustainers pack the next container full of munitions, distribute fuel, police the streets, feed the force and perform an immeasurable amount of other invaluable support tasks—the importance of their craft often gets lost in the fog of plans and policy at the national level.

What Would Clausewitz Do?

What Would Clausewitz Do?

Several years ago, during a visit to the U.S. Army War College, I was invited to have lunch with some of its instructors. The school teaches Army officers about strategy and its course offerings (“Civil-Military Relations,” “Peace and Stability Operations,” “Irregular Warfare”) reflect that mandate. So, naturally, the lunch discussion focused on strategy, and how to teach it. While I don’t now recall the exact details of that conversation, a statement by one of the war college’s professors has stayed with me. It brought immediate laughter — and unanimous assent. “Just remember,” he said, “that no matter what the question, the answer is always Clausewitz.”

The Distraction of Service Biases

The Distraction of Service Biases

The inter-service biases we all hold have a tendency to distract us from seeing the forest for the trees. Carl Forsling’s analysis of the Army Vision reflects his biases in favor of the U.S. Marine Corps. A clear-eyed assessment of both the Army Vision Force 2025 and the Marine’s Expeditionary Force 21 makes it clear that both services’ vision of themselves and the future are actually complementary.

Leadership Lessons from Gettysburg

Leadership Lessons from Gettysburg

Military leadership comes in all different forms. It can be embodied in the leadership of troops on a battlefield, or it can occur behind the scenes in moments no less important. The Army defines leadership as influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to improve the organization and accomplish the mission. These bland, doctrinal terms are best brought to life in the form of historical vignettes, a valuable tool for teaching the process of leadership.

Bring Back BRAC — Permanently

Bring Back BRAC — Permanently

In 1977, Congress effectively took responsibility for the base closure process. Today, it shirks that responsibility — threatening national security and the Pentagon’s fiscal position — by ignoring pleas for a new BRAC round. Not only should Congress approve a new BRAC round, it should authorize the BRAC process to occur at regular intervals in accordance with recommendations from the 2005 Commission. Threats to the United States will continue to change and the country’s defense posture should be free to change as well.

Same Wars, Different Fights: The Army and Air Force Visions

Same Wars, Different Fights: The Army and Air Force Visions

These two visions are a result of the last 15 years of fighting experience that the Army and Air Force have built. They are both highly divergent, and also complementary. The Army has taken the brunt of the changes that have occurred in the global civilization since the fall of the Soviet Union and is now learning to operate against connected and individually powerful enemies who operate in complex social and urban terrains. The Air Force has been finding its connection to its joint family, overcoming the hubris of early airpower advocates and finding a voice in the joint fight. The two services probably fight better together now than at any other time in the past. But can that hard won cooperation be sustained with such radically different visions of their futures?

Innovation & the Army Vision: Responding to the Soufflé Conundrum

Innovation & the Army Vision: Responding to the Soufflé Conundrum

In the course of thirteen pages, the Army lays out how the world’s most powerful land force must look one decade from now. This already difficult task is complicated by the fact that those ambitious (or crazy) enough to take on a document of this scope find themselves in an international environment where threats span the gamut of non-state actors to world superpowers, with a healthy dose of the latest Department of Defense buzzword, “hybrid,” thrown into the mix. To respond to these oftentimes still nebulous threats, the Army advocates for eight characteristics of a force for the future.Innovation is the most alluring of these characteristics to policymakers and the public alike. However, it could also prove to be the vision’s undoing should the conditions on the ground change.

The Army Looks to the Future

The Army Looks to the Future

The Chief of Staff of the Army released the results of a study which was designed to determine how the Army can best achieve “success in battle” in the future. I was able to obtain a copy of this report and want to share it here. The Chief convened a group of the best military brains available because he understands that “wars are still fought on little bits of bloody earth, and they are ended when the enemy’s will to resist is broken, and armed men stand victorious on his home soil.”

All Hell Broke Loose: The U.S. Army and OPERATION TOENAILS

All Hell Broke Loose: The U.S. Army and OPERATION TOENAILS

Few people, save avid students of the U.S. war in the Pacific, have ever heard of the small island group called New Georgia. Yet, in the summer of 1943, the island was the scene of some of the most brutal fighting of the entire war. It was on New Georgia where the 43rd Infantry Division experienced the highest number of cases of neuropsychiatric casualties (variably known as combat fatigue, shell shock, war neurosis, or post-traumatic stress disorder) casualties in any division during one operation in the entire war. For two of the three Army divisions on New Georgia, it was their baptism of fire, and one that they would never forget. While the capture of New Georgia was vital to the strategic and operational success of the Solomon Islands Campaign, the battle itself is a supremely interesting study in small-unit tactics, joint Army-Navy operations, logistics operations, and the trials of a joint command.

Army-Air Force Talks

Army-Air Force Talks

 Dan and Dave, no relation to the famous Olympic decathletes, began a dialogue following a workshop on the development of an Air Force Operating Concept. At the conclusion of day 1 of the workshop, Dan and Dave had a discussion on the future of the military; to include the direction our respective services are headed. The idea popped up that these deep discussions should be published, for others to read and debate. The richness and value of discussions on the future of warfare is worthless if left between two people.

Mea Culpa or "The law is easy"*

*Conditions Apply

Will Beasley provided a different perspective on the #Professionalism debate in his piece on The Rise and Fall of US Naval #Professionalism. What I found most interesting was his discussion of ‘The Golden Age of Professionalization’ and Wilensky’s five-steps involved in an occupational group attaining the status of ‘profession.’ Beasley’s article was intended to provide a response and another perspective on my previous post ‘The Military #Profession — Lawyers, Ethics and the Profession of Arms’.

I noticed that exception was taken to my comment: ‘The law is easy — ethics is hard.’ I thought I’d clarify my comment to remove any misunderstanding. My comment was meant to be read in its entirety and to convey the point that, at times, the answer to the legal problem is easier when compared to the ethical quandries that accompany it. As Winston Churchill once remarked, and I paraphrase, foreign policy choices (which include decisions about how international law is applied) are often between the dreadful and the truly awful. This is the context I had in mind when I made my comment.

…at times, the answer to the legal problem is easier when compared to the ethical quandries that accompany it.

‘The law is easy-ethics is hard’ refers specifically to the application of the laws relating to the use of force (jus ad bellum), the laws of war (jus in bellum); and national policy in operational contexts. In many respects, the application of the laws of war are guided by national policy, and as a result the ‘answer’ to a particular legal question is given to us by the national command authority or coalition headquarters through rules of engagement or other operational orders that impact on how an operation is to be conducted. The difficulty is where the law or the policy is clear but its application may create a complex ethical dilemma. This is why the law is *relatively* easy and ethics is comparatively harder.

One example that comes to mind is the situation during the Bosnian conflict, involving the Dutch Battalion — Dutchbat — who were ostensibly guarding the enclave of Srebrenica, a United Nations ‘Safe Area’. The Dutchbat was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Thom Karremans, who decided to act in accordance within the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate and orders from UNHQ. The Dutchbat was in an invidious position of having to morally protect the enclave while lacking the military capability to do so. The chain of events leading to the fall of Srebrenica and ethical dilemmas are discussed in more detail elsewhere [1]. In summary, Karremans made the decision to act in accordance with his legal obligation (comply with superior orders and policy) but resulting in the ethical dilemma of being unable to protect those in the enclave from being rounded up and, as the world later learned, falling victim to genocide. In this case, the law was easy — a clear legal answer was available, but was unhelpful in resolving the complex ethical dilemma that unfolded before Dutchbat and Karremans [3].

I extend my apology for any misunderstanding. I don’t mean to offend my learned friends out there. In a domestic context, the law is definitely hard. But in the international system, which is largely one of nations regulating themselves, law is more about politics than jurisprudence [2] and can sometimes be ‘easier’ when juxtaposed against the ethical dilemmas created in the wake of their application.

The Proprietor of ‘Carl’s Cantina’ is an Australian military officer who has served in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Proprietor is an Associate Member of the Military Writers Guild and is currently writing a thesis on Australian civil-military relations. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not reflect those of the Australian Defence Force.

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Notes:

[1] See paper by LTCOL P.J. deVin, ‘Srebrenica, the impossible choices of a commander’.

[2] The law as a continuation of politics by other means is a whole topic on its own and frequently discussed over at the Lawfare blog.

[3] If you want to follow the subsequent legal action against the State of the Netherlands brought by Mothers of Srebrenica, a good starting point is here.