The Movement that Seeks a State

Though much ink has already been spilled regarding the Islamic State’s theology, it is important to place this group within the wider movement of political Islam that emphasizes Salafism. Salafism has a lengthy history, and has been mustered to support nationalistic insurgencies as well as transnational terrorist networks well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the tenets of Salafism are deceptively simple, the implementation of these ideas varies greatly.

To call this simply a religious matter neglects the clear manipulation of religion by some Salafist movements for political purposes. At the same time, to ignore the theological undertones in these movements risks missing key insights. The Islamic State is merely the latest network to appropriate Salafism. Prior to the Arab Spring, Al Qaeda was the most widely known Salafist group advocating anti-establishment upheaval. But it too, was not the first militant Salafist organization or movement. As the the Islamic State will not be the last. Analyzing the ideological underpinnings of these movements is vital to anticipating future challenges and opportunities. While militant Salafism is expanding in the region, there is also an expansion of Iranian supported Shia militias. These trends present a staggering risk for conflict, a fact that Western policymakers seem to want to ignore.

A Baseline of Understanding

Salafism is a religiously based sociopolitical movement that has generated numerous interpretations despite its apparently simple call to live like the first generation of Muslims. Salafists traditionally have been of the “quietist” variety, a term used by Joas Wagemakers to describe the movement’s focus onda’wah, or proselytizing. This quiet focus was adopted because of a perception that society was not yet prepared to return to the idealized sociopolitical practices of Prophet Muhammad’s and his followers. Quietist Salafists have also tended to support Muslim rulers, even autocrats with secular leanings.[1]This support stems from the belief that excommunication, takfir, of a fellow Muslim was such a serious matter that it should only be undertaken when absolutely certain. It was more prudent to point out a sinful act instead of accuse a fellow Muslim of infidelity.[2] These interpretations within Salafism were convenient for Muslim heads of state, providing flexibility with policy as long as some deference was provided to faith.

Sayyid Qutb (Wikicommons)

In response to repression and the perceived failings of secular statecraft, prominent Salafists started to challenge this apolitical interpretation. One of the most influential voices in this was Sayyid Qutb, who argued that Muslim rulers should be opposed, perhaps violently, because they were following secular forms of governance. He referenced back to Ibn Taymiyya, an important scholar during the Mongol era, who justified fighting Mongol invaders in the Arab world because these invaders maintained heretical practices despite converting to Islam. Using any form of worship or governance that was not expressly part of early Islamic teachings is considered by more radical Salafists to be a violation of the unity of God, as the sole spiritual and legal authority.[3] According to Qutb, referencing Ibn Taymiyya, it was acceptable to excommunicate Muslim leaders who replaced God’s legal authority with secular institutions. These ideas were seized upon by fellow Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri and the leadership of Al Qaeda. A similar interpretation of excommunication was developed by Ibn Wahhab, who was and remains influential in Saudi Arabia. His focus on apostasy further detailed practices that could also be considered heretical including prayer to saints or the adulation of shrines.[4] Quintan Wiktorowicz speculates that during the anti-Soviet conflict in Afghanistan, these two interpretations of apostasy were shared by Egyptian and Saudi militants, producing the theological beliefs of Al Qaeda.[5] Ibn Taymiyya’s interpretation of God’s sole authority in spiritual and political matters was influential in the anti-colonial rebellions of the nineteenth century in Pashtun lands as well. From these fighters and their theological interpretations, one can draw a direct link to the Deobandi school in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as the writings of Qutb.[6]

Bin Laden’s command center in Pakistan (Wikicommons)

Salafist militants have also differed over launching defensive versus offensive operations, the targeting of civilians, and the acceptability of suicide attacks. Different groups have referenced different teachings or historical incidents to justify the applicability of their tactics and strategies. As a result of different emphasis on sources, there is a degree of interpretive flexibility in Salafist militancy.[7] Defensive jihad can be waged by a group without full authority over a territory or a people. Offensive jihad, on the other hand, requires the authority of a Caliph.[8] Al Qaeda has interpreted Salafism as justifying attacks against the secular regimes in the Islamic world as well as their enablers — the often cited near and far enemies. While Al Qaeda has an expansive view of acceptable civilian targets, the group has also been critical of too much violence directed against Muslims by militant Salafists.[9] Zawahiri advised the emir of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, to minimize casualties among the faithful and build an emirate which could one day potentially become a Caliphate. In Zawahiri’s interpretation of Salafism, targeting Shia was a mistake because the majority of them were innocents merely practicing the faith they had known all their lives. Ultimately, the Caliphate would be critical to uniting all Muslims under one authority and taking offensive actions against neighboring regimes as well as Israel.[10] The fissures between Zarqawi and Al Qaeda that played out during the US occupation of Iraq have ruptured once again. The organization that evolved from Zarqawi’s bloodthirsty rebellion has declared itself a Caliphate and as such demanded the obedience of the entire Muslim world.

Salafists are also learning that they need to find ways of developing popular support in order to increase the chance of success for these projects.

It is important to note before discussing this split in greater detail that militant Salafists are essentially arguing over the implementation of common principles. These factions do not object to the effort toward building Salafist states.[11] Opponents of the so-called Caliphate of the Islamic State argue that it lacks sufficient territory or clerical support to make such a bold declaration. There have been other state-building projects within the broader Salafist movement. No matter the fate of the so-called Islamic State, militant Salafists will continue to strive for the establishment of a state in the future. Salafists are also learning that they need to find ways of developing popular support in order to increase the chance of success for these projects.[12] Some quietists have broken with the apolitical nature of their interpretations and participated in elections. Setbacks for these democratic-Salafists, such as in Egypt, have encouraged more militant interpretations.

The differences between Al Qaeda’s and the Islamic State’s interpretations hinge largely on the scope of takfir. This and other differences have emerged among bin Laden’s network, but at times these differing groups have managed to work together as well. Western analysts must remember this when studying the latest trends within this movement. Zarqawi received funding from bin Laden and approval to open a training camp in Afghanistan. Zarqawi focused on the near enemy at a time when Al Qaeda targeted the far enemy. There have been numerous reports of some differences between the two, but the exact differences may never be known to us. Al Qaeda declared autocrats and institutions to be apostate, while Zarqawi was convinced that the Muslim world needed to be purged, bloodily, of apostate peoples.[13] Zarqawi’s training camps in Afghanistan included many former prisoners from Jordan.[14] His ideological severity seems more like the beliefs held by Abu Musab al-Suri, who thought that Al Qaeda camps lacked sufficient theological training in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[15] Suri, much like Zarqawi, operated in a semi-independent affiliation with Al Qaeda.[16] Al Qaeda saw itself as an anti-establishment Salafist vanguard, whereas Zarqawi saw his organization as fighting for a new establishment.[17]

Abu Musab al-Suri had links to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, which rebelled against the Alawite regime and was mercilessly squashed in the 1980s. Suri was trained in Egypt and in Iraq for the fight against Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Even one of his Iraqi trainers had a direct link to Sayyid Qutb.[18] After the near destruction of the Syrian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, Suri went to work with a radical propagandist, Abu Qatada. Qatada advocated the killing of rivals and their family members during the bloody conflict in Algeria, the same fight which gave members of Al Qaeda pause for the amount of Muslim bloodshed.[19] Qatada appears to have had ties with Zarqawi as well, as he provided the letter of introduction for Zarqawi in order to schedule a meeting with bin Laden.[20] In Afghanistan, Suri’s reputation was that of an extremist even among the militants. He killed individuals who wished to leave his group and advocated a wide interpretation of takfir, similar to the beliefs held by Zarqawi.[21] At least one follower of Suri, Amer Azizi, joined Zarqawi’s network in Iraq.[22]

Mugshot of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (Wikicommons)

During the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, Zarqawi came to be one of the most infamous insurgent-terrorist commanders of the conflict. His network, which was merged eventually with the overall Al Qaeda organization, remains active in Iraq and Syria but has undergone a number of changes. The current leader of this network, now calling itself the Islamic State, was declared a Caliph last year. A decade before that title was claimed, he was a Sunni insurgent in an American run jail.[23] Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, now the so-called Caliph, was a key figure in the jail because he seemed to be able to maintain the peace among different factions, according to a fellow prisoner interviewed by The Guardian.[24] Baghdadi appears to have used his role as a “fixer” in the prison to build a greater power base. He held a PhD is Islamic studies and claimed descent from the Quraysh tribe, the same tribe as the Prophet Muhammad.[25] Prisoners developed more expansive networks in the massive jail and taught one another improved tactics.

A Caliphate Born in Prison

According to a secular Kurd who was a high-ranking member of Iraq’s Interior Ministry, the insurgency was significantly aided by the Syrian government in an attempt to discredit the US. As the insurgency faltered during the Sunni Awakening in 2008, Syrian officials met with the Salafists and coordinated with exiled Iraqi Ba’athist officials. Their machinations were introduced to the country when a series of massive bombings took place in Baghdad in the summer of 2009. Baghdadi rose to lead the descendent organization of Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2010 upon the death of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who relied upon the Qurayshi PhD as a courier.[26] Two subsequent events would drastically impact the stability of the region. The US military withdrew from Iraq, leaving Nouri al-Maliki with significant control over the country’s fate, and the Arab Spring encouraged a largely Sunni rebellion against Bashar al-Assad, Hafez’s son.

Prior to the revolt against Bashar al-Assad, Salafism did not have many adherents in Syria. The fighting in the 1980s against the first Assad resulted in many deaths and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was ostracized.[27] A marginalized segment of the Sunni population would find Salafism appealing as the uprising spread in the wake of the Arab Spring. This segment was not closely tied to pro-government clerics, and was searching for an ideological justification for fighting back against the government’s increasingly brutal crackdown on dissidents. These presented opportunities for the first Salafist militant groups in the country, including Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham. More moderate members of the opposition were hoping to replicate the “Libyan model,” seeking international assistance in toppling the autocrat. When that assistance failed to materialize, Salafism and militancy were available as an alternative.[28] Jabhat al-Nusra was initially criticized for its use of violence, but soon adapted to gain more popular support among the opposition movements. Al Qaeda linked clerics endorsed this faction as the best Salafist militant group as well.[29] Jabhat al-Nusra seemed to be following Al Qaeda’s methodology by supporting other radical groups within a broader movement governed by consensus.[30] As Jabhat al-Nusra gained prominence, the Islamic State of Iraq announced that it was the force behind the group and attempted to assert control over the organization.[31]

At the end of 2013 and in the beginning of 2014, other rebel groups began to attack the Islamic State in western Syria, forcing the group to focus on the eastern part of the country adjacent to Iraq.[32] At the same time, the Syrian regime also began to focus more on the rivals to the Islamic State, providing an opportunity for Baghdadi’s group to consolidate in the East.[33] The Islamic State went so far as to kill the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra in Raqqa in December 2013.[34] In an attempt to unify Salafist groups in Syria, Zawahiri designated a long-time Al Qaeda associate as a mediator in the dispute. Abu Khalid al-Suri had a lengthy career with Salafist militancy and spent much of that time with Abu Musab al-Suri. As their noms de guerre indicate, both men were from Syria. Abu Khalid was a top commander in Ahrar al-Sham and may have been viewed by Zawahiri as a potential honest broker in the dispute.

The Islamic State’s history in Iraq demonstrates a willingness to assassinate rivals in order to consolidate power.

As Aron Lund points out, Abu Khalid had a more “nuanced” relationship with Al Qaeda than some reports indicate. His long affiliation with Abu Musab, including a stint rebelling against Hafez al-Assad in the 1980s, indicates that he was in fact not a part of Al Qaeda but would have worked alongside the group on numerous occasions. Both Abu Khalid and Abu Musab had ties with the Madrid 2004 bombing cell. His role in Ahrar al-Sham, and potentially his ties to Al Qaeda, had been minimized with an alternate nom de guerre prior to his designation as a mediator among militants.[35] Nonetheless, Abu Khalid was a bona fide Salafist militant and terrorist committed to a largely compatible interpretation of Salafism as that held by Al Qaeda. He along with another commander were killed in early 2014. Ahrar al-Sham has accused the Islamic State of orchestrating the attacks, although there has been no claim of responsibility. The Islamic State’s history in Iraq demonstrates a willingness to assassinate rivals in order to consolidate power.

Finding Allies

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have long had a dubious relationship with Shia militias.[36] These militias, long supported by Iran, were responsible for death squads that killed thousands of Sunnis during the US occupation.[37] As the US withdrew from Iraq, Maliki sought to monopolize control of the security establishment. Politically motivated prosecutions were leveled against prominent Sunni officials in the government, forcing some to flee.[38] The government also would not integrate the militias from the Sunni Awakening, which had fought against Al Qaeda in Iraq, into the state’s security apparatus. However, even some of the most terrible Shia militias were integrated into the government’s security forces. Demonstrations were held in response to these policies in Sunni regions of Iraq. In the spring of 2013, government forces killed demonstrators in Hawija. Sunni politicians that remained involved with the central government immediately lost standing within their communities. Increasing sectarian violence in 2013 provided an opportunity for the Islamic State to reassert its control in Sunni areas of Iraq.[39] Initially, the Islamic State would work with other insurgent groups, but after government forces were routed the Islamic State would consolidate power either by expelling rivals or killing them.[40]

By establishing a Caliphate, the Islamic State was attempting to demand obedience from all Muslims in the world.

As the conflict in Iraq escalated, Maliki portrayed the clash in sectarian terms, even going so far as to suggest that the direction of the qibla shift from Mecca to Karbala.[41] This statement is impossible to overemphasize. The Prime Minister of Iraq was advocating a shift in the focus of daily prayer to an important city in Shia Islam. The Islamic State, with a unified territory along the borders of Syria and Iraq, asserted that it was now a Caliphate. By establishing a Caliphate, the Islamic State was attempting to demand obedience from all Muslims in the world. The Caliphate likely was also a strategically timed declaration in the ongoing conflict within Salafist militant groups as well as a way to continue attracting recruits. Increasingly radicalized actions and rhetoric within the region have also likely influenced this decision. This state-building project had been tried by the followers of Zarqawi before.

Some within the Islamic State thought claim of statehood in 2006 was too premature, attempting to overcome battlefield weakness with a proclamation they were not yet ready to realize.[42] The Islamic State gained a significant infusion of fighters after the declaration of a Caliphate.[43] The group has also emphasized the provision of social services within territory it controls, indicating that the group has learned from its first state-building efforts in 2006 and 2007.[44] The Islamic State is also trying to recruit and utilize more skilled individuals as it takes over state institutions in areas it controls.[45] The Islamic State invests the most resources in strategically important areas where it believes it can maintain control.

The Islamic State uses its extreme interpretations of takfir and Salafism to justify the group’s brutality. New recruits are quizzed in theology, but not all recruits join the group for religious reasons.[46] Sharia training is part of the organizations indoctrination process, and those that question the brutality of the group are re-educated in the specific interpretations the group has derived from religion and history.[47] More senior members of the organization focus on strategic works from militant Islam including Abu Bakr Naji’sManagement of Savagery. Naji viewed politics as essential to the militant movement, and stressed the need to communicate Sharia-based justifications through propaganda. He wrote that this was the means through which a movement could build a state.[48]

The Islamic State stresses particularly “arcane” episodes from the earliest days of Islam, often using obscure punishments that are then broadcast by its extensive propaganda machine.[49] Hassan Hassan has noted that if a Salafist were to seek out explanations for such brutality, supporters of the Islamic State would be more willing to discuss the underlying logic and the particular episodes the group is seeking to emulate. In a way, the Islamic State projects its shared ideological history on all militant Salafists with the most brutal version of the movement. It dares these militants to accept the logic of the so-called Caliphate, which would necessitate joining the movement. While graphic punishments are a means of terrifying the population into obeying the Caliphate, they also serve as a propaganda message to Salafists around the world, demonstrating that the punishments and the system of governance from the first generation of Islam are once again in place.[50]

Abu Khalid al-Suri, who was likely assassinated in early 2014 by the Islamic State, is one example of so-called Afghan Arabs, militants who participated in the anti-Soviet conflict, operating in Syria.[51] The older generation of militants making their way to Syria may have presented the Islamic State with a challenge to their vision of exclusive political authority. The Islamic State also recently released an issue of Dabiq, its occasional online magazine, which accused Al Qaeda of deviating from Salafism with its embrace of Deobandi Islam and the Taliban. The article, with the title “Al Qaeda of Waziristan,” was written by an apparent former member of Al Qaeda, accused fighters in Asia of practices that would seem questionable to some militant Salafists. The publication also accused Al Qaeda of sending adherents to Syria in order to assert control over the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra. In this issue ofDabiq, the sixth edition from the terrorist group, bin Laden’s hesitation to declare Muslim leaders apostates is also referenced.[52] Interestingly, in this issue of Dabiq it is Zarqawi who convinces bin Laden to declare the rulers of Saudi Arabia and their armies to be apostates. In some versions of this story, it was Abu Musab al-Suri who advocated declaring the Saudi royal family apostates a decade before this alleged discussion.[53] The former Al Qaeda militant also includes the rulers of Muslim autocracies and their entire armies to be apostates. This is an expansive version of takfir including potentially hundreds of thousands of Muslims as targets for excommunication and death, something Al Qaeda has always sought to avoid but the Islamic State seems willing to attempt.

The Situation as it Stands

While the Islamic State has increasingly been attacked by Western and regional powers, it is unlikely that the Sunni insurgencies in both Syria and Iraq will end peacefully in the near future. Another version of the Sunni Awakening is unlikely while Iraqi politics remain sectarian and polarized, and while Iraqi Security Forces operate alongside Shia militias as they have done in 2014 and 2015.[54] The newest Interior Minister in Iraq is a member of the Badr Organization, a group led by Hadi Al-Amiri. Amiri is a former death squad commander who had a fondness for drilling Sunni skulls. Badr had sought to place Amiri in this important security post, but settled on a compromise.[55] It is doubtful that this compromise will engender much optimism from the Sunni community. The Islamic State represents a joining of the Syrian and Iraqi conflict among Sunnis and at the same time this has occurred among Shia militants. Shia militants from Syria have traveled to fight the Islamic State and other Sunni factions in Iraq.[56] Iran has been deeply involved in supporting Shia militias as has Lebanese Hezbollah. The Islamic State’s broad interpretation of takfir and their willingness to kill innocent Shia encourages extremism among the Shia communities of Iraq and Syria. A vicious cycle of sectarian violence appears to be prevailing in the region.

Salafism has appealed to opposition groups across a broad stretch of the Islamic world. In the North Caucasus much like in Syria, Salafism emerged as a unifying force even though it had little previous influence in the region. In that region of the world, local Islamic authorities were also seen as corrupt and beholden to the regime, with Salafism offering a sociopolitical order and a unifying ideology to replace those in power. Also as in Syria, repression from the ruling elites and an influx of Salafist-terrorists hardened the rebellion into one with extremist religious overtones.[57] Now, fighters from the North Caucasus as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan have joined their Arab coreligionists to fight the autocrats of the Middle East.

Despite Salafism’s apparent simple sociopolitical program, there have been three main interpretation within the Salafists movement: Quietist, Democratic, and Militant. Quietists have focused on preparing society for a return to an idealized form of governance. The democratic-Salafists, sought to gain power through elections. With the fall of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, this segment of the movement has hit a significant setback. However, the involvement with elections indicates that innovation within Salafism can occur. More ominously, however, militant Salafists are also innovating new methods of state-building as well as broader definitions of excommunication. Understanding the ideology behind these movements is critical to addressing potential challenges to peace and stability. It should also be noted that Salafist militancy seems to be more radicalized, especially with Iran gaining greater influence in the Middle East. As Quintan Wiktorowicz has observed, there has been an “erosion of critical restraints used to limit warfare and violence in classical Islam” that helped Islam to reach its highest cultural contributions.[58] The militant factions within the movement have attempted state-building and this is likely to continue. Prominent thinkers in this movement have studied successful insurgencies from around the world as well.[59] The autocrats of the Middle East now face a significant challenge against the legitimacy and integrity of their states. There is a danger that the militant faction of Salafism will improve upon state-building and create further challenges for us all.

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Chris Zeitz is a veteran of military intelligence within the U.S. Army who served one year in Afghanistan. While in the Army, he also attended the Defense Language School in Monterey and studied Modern Standard Arabic. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Diplomacy from Norwich University. The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Notes:

[1] Waagemakers, J. (2015, January 27). “Jihadi — Salafi Views of the Islamic State,” Monkey Cage Blog of the Washington Post, Accessed from:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/27/jihadi-salafi-views-of-the-islamic-state/

[2] Wiktorowicz, Q. (2005). “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28, p. 77.

[3] Wiktorowicz, p. 78–80.

[4] Wiktorowicz,, p. 81

[5] Wiktorowicz,, p. 83

[6] Wiktorowicz, p. 78; Roy, O. (1990). Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 56–67

[7] Wiktorowicz,, p. 76

[8] Wiktorowicz,, p. 83–84

[9] Wiktorowicz,, p. 89

[10] Wright, L. (2006, September 11). “The Master Plan: For the New Theorists of Jihad, Al Qaeda Is Just the Beginning,” The New Yorker, Accessed from:http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/09/11/the-master-plan

[11] Wagemakers, J.

[12] Wagemakers, J.

[13] Zelin, A. (2014). “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 2–3 Accessed from: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-war-between-isis-and-al-qaeda-for-supremacy-of-the-global-jihadist; Wright

[14] Zelin, p. 2

[15] Wright

[16] Cruickshank, P. & Hage Ali, M. (2007). “Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30, p. 2

[17] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. (2014) “The Group that Calls Itself a State: Under-standing the Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, p. 3 Accessed from:https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-group-that-calls-itself-a-state-understanding-the-evolution-and-challenges-of-the-islamic-state

[18] Cruickshank & Hage Ali, p. 3

[19] Cruickshank & Hage Ali, p. 4

[20] Lister, C. (2014), “Profiling the Islamic State,” Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, p. 6 Accessed from:http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/12/profiling-islamic-state-lister

[21] Cruickshank & Hage Ali, p. 7

[22] Cruickshank & Hage Ali, p. 9–11

[23] Chulov, M. (2014, December 11). “ISIS: The Inside Story,” The Guardian, Accessed from:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-storyon February 9, 2015.

[24] Chulov

[25] Chulov

[26] Chulov

[27] International Crisis Group. (2012, October 12), “Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition,” Middle East Report No. 131, p. 4. Accessed from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2012/mena/syria-tentative-jihad-syria-s-fundamentalist-opposition.aspx; Schanzer, J. & Tahiroglu, M. (2014). “Bordering on Terrorism: Turkey’s Syria Policy and the Rise of the Islamic State,” p. 8–9 Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Accessed from:http://defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/schanzer-jonathan-bordering-on-terrorism

[28] ICG p. 1–7

[29] ICG, p. 11–13

[30] Caris, C. & Reynolds, S. (2014). “ISIS Governance in Syria,” Middle East Security Report No. 22, Institute for the Study of War, p. 10 Accessed from:http://www.understandingwar.org/report/isis-governance-syria

[31] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. p. 16; Lister, p. 13

[32] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. p. 21; Lister, p. 13–14

[33] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. p. 24–25

[34] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. p. 17

[35] Lund, A. (2014, February 24) “Who and What Was Abu Khalid al-Suri Part I,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Accessed from:http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/24/who-and-what-was-abu-khalid-al-suri-part-i

[36] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. p. 22–71

[37] Morris, L. (2014, October 18). “Appointment of Iraq’s New Interior Minister Opens Door to Militia and Iranian Influence,” Washington Post, Accessed from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/appointment-of-iraqs-new-interior-minister-opens-door-to-militia-and-iranian-influence/2014/10/18/f6f2a347-d38c-4743-902a-254a169ca274_story.html

[38] Visser, R. (2014). “Iraq’s New Government and the Question of Sunni Inclusion,” CTC Sentinel, 7 (9), p. 14–16.

[39] Adnan, S. & Reese, A. (2014). “Beyond the Islamic Insurgency: Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency,” Middle East Security Report No. 24, Institute for the Study of War, p. 4, 10–13 Accessed from:http://www.understandingwar.org/report/beyond-islamic-state-iraqs-sunni-insurgency

[40] Adnan, S. & Reese, A. p. 16–17

[41] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. p. 23

[42] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. p. 19

[43] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. p. 43

[44] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. p. 65–67

[45] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. p. 75

[46] Hassan, H. (2015, January 24). “The Secret World of ISIS Training Camps — Ruled by Sacred Texts and the Sword,” The Guardian, Accessed from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/25/inside-isis-training-camps

[47] Hassan, H

[48] Wright, L. (2006, September 11). “The Master Plan: For the New Theorists of Jihad, Al Qaeda Is Just the Beginning,” The New Yorker, Accessed from: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/09/11/the-master-plan

[49] Hassan, H

[50] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B. p. 70

[51] Lund, A. (2014, February 25) “Who and What Was Abu Khalid al-Suri Part II,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Accessed from:http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54634

[52] Joscelyn, T. (2015, January 5). “The Islamic State’s Curious Cover Story,” Long War Journal, Accessed from:http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/01/al_qaeda_defector_fe.php

[53] Cruickshank, P. & Hage Ali, M. p. 2

[54] al-‘Ubaiydi, M., Lahoud, N., Milton, D. & Price, B., p. 79

[55] Morris, L. (2014, October 18). “Appointment of Iraq’s New Interior Minister Opens Door to Militia and Iranian Influence,” Washington Post, Accessed from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/appointment-of-iraqs-new-interior-minister-opens-door-to-militia-and-iranian-influence/2014/10/18/f6f2a347-d38c-4743-902a-254a169ca274_story.html

[56] Smyth, P. (2015). “The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects,” Policy Focus 138, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 2 Accessed from: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-shiite-jihad-in-syria-and-its-regional-effects

[57] Souleimanov, E. (2011). “The Caucasus Emirate: Genealogy of an Islamist Insurgency,” Middle East Policy, 18 (4), p. 159–162

[58] Wiktorowicz,, p. 94

[59] Ryan, M. (2013, September 22). “What Al Qaeda Learned from Mao,” The Boston Globe, Accessed from:http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/09/21/what-qaeda-learned-from-mao/E7Ga91ZVktjgiyWC90nJ6M/story.html

#Reviewing ISIL's Playbook

A Look at Managing Savagery:
The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Uma will Pass

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ISIL has a textbook. Its actions thus far have so closely followed this textbook, it is astounding. The textbook is translated into English, and not particularly difficult to read and understand. Suspend your disbelief. Maybe ISIL is more than a random group of irreverent murderous thugs taking advantage of ungoverned space. Maybe the counter-ISIL strategy is lacking.

Managing Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Uma Will Pass was written by Islamic strategist Abu Bakr Naji in 2004, translated in 2006 by William McCants who is a leading scholar of militant Islam. It describes a three phase approach to establishing an Islamic state. The theory behind ISIL’s entrenchment in Iraq and Syria is accurately described in the decisive operation, managing savagery. But don’t be misled by the terminology. “Savage” refers to non-Muslims and moderate Muslims. The violence ISIL displays is an effort to “manage” the “savages.” It is a disciplined program to establish Salafism, and its members are not undisciplined criminals any more than the Nazi Gestapo in the 1930s, or Stalin’s security apparatchiks in the 1950s.

The book is highly prescriptive, more Jominian than Clauswitzian, and equally brilliant. The author describes a version of mission command under the heading “art of management” providing guidance for who should lead, how to make decisions, how to delegate authorities, when to engage in combat, when to use violence against a population, Sharia law and justice, and how to gain and maintain the initiative. He describes formidable obstacles to establishing an Islamic state and what to do about them, such as: countering infiltration of adversaries, countering Western messaging, increasing the lack of administrative cadres, how to minimize members changing loyalties, and how to reverse the decreasing numbers of “true believers.”

The three phased approach bears striking similarity to US operational doctrine, which begins with shaping operations, then decisive combat operations, and then transition to peace.

It is not a coincidence that Americans now characterize themselves as “war weary,” because they are victims of a deliberate strategy of exhaustion.

The first phase, according to the author, is “vexation and exhaustion.” It can be compared to the colonial American Continental Army’s approach to combat against the British Empire in the 1700s, or any number of successful asymmetric conflicts throughout the centuries. In such cases, the weaker opponent must wear down the stronger opponent until it can achieve some level of parity. The author provides a number of historic examples, all of which seem to pit Islamic warriors against non-believers. The most compelling is the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, where the Mujahedeen successfully wore down the Red Army. The book describes setting strategic “traps” for Americans in Iraq, causing the US to plunge further and further into an inescapable quagmire. It is not a coincidence that Americans now characterize themselves as “war weary,” because they are victims of a deliberate strategy of exhaustion.

This strategy is in fact an extension of Usama Bin Laden’s strategy of limited warfare employed by Al Qaeda. Abu Bakr Naji assumed that pulling Americans deeper into the Iraq war would eventually lead to the collapse of the United States because he inaccurately attributed the collapse of the Soviet Union to Mujahedeen operations in Afghanistan. Therefore, its strategy of exhaustion against the US was only partially successful. Although it succeeded in making Americans war weary, it has yet to achieve its desired goal, which is the collapse of the United States.

The second phase of establishing an Islamic state, “managing savagery,” is the decisive operation and best describes current ISIL efforts. The focus of the second phase is to remove elements it believes as cancerous to a pure Islamic society. Although Western media sources tend to characterize ISIL’s penchant for dramatic executions as irrational, the source of its violent behavior is rational because it follows a logical purpose motivated by a combination of fear, honor, and interest. Although brutal and abhorrent, it is rational in the same sense that the Rwanda Genocide in 1994, or Nazi extermination of Jews, followed a logic and purpose. Garnering very little attention in Western media, ISIL also forces the population to continue working; requiring bakeries and administrative offices to remain open. It patrols the streets to ensure markets and retail stores are not mobbed or looted. It appoints local villagers as leaders. It establishes a school system to “properly educate” the next generation of Salafi Muslims. It establishes courts and a system of justice, beginning with a public square in which public executions may be conducted. Compared to Nouri Al Maliki’s Iraq, or Bashir Al Asad’s Syria, much of the Sunni population find ISIL governance more attractive.[1]

The third phase focuses on expanding the Islamic state and provides guidance on establishing affiliations, franchises, and alliances. The book even explains which countries and regions are ripe for an Islamic revolution. Particularly noteworthy, the author rejects the boundaries of existing Middle Eastern countries as western colonial fabrications. When he refers to “Syria” for example, he is referring to a population that likely spans into Turkey and Iraq. His theory of expansion seems to be theoretically similar to the Marxist expansion of communism, in the sense that a global revolution establishing a pure Salafi Islamic state is inevitable.

Overall, the strategy described in Managing Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Uma will Pass is a brilliant and artful theory of achieving a very difficult end state with extremely limited means. Since it is the strategy of our adversary, this conclusion may be difficult to accept. Even more difficult to accept is the necessity to re-think the counter-ISIL strategy in the context of ISIL’s text book. Specifically, will the counter-ISIL strategy destroy ISIL, or feed into the establishment of an Islamic state? If the strategy is similar to Communist expansion, would a closer study of George Kennan’s containment strategy outlined in his “Long Telegram” be more appropriate? In a region where Western democracy is not understood and largely rejected, what alternatives to Assad and Maliki can the U.S. provide that ISIL is not providing?

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Harry York is a strategic planner in the Pentagon. He holds a Master’s Degree from the Army School of Advanced Military Studies and a Bachelor’s Degree in Russian from the University of Washington. He has multiple deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan as both an aviator and an operational planner. The views expressed here are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Notes:

[i] Mr. Hassan Hassan, co-author of the best selling book ISIS: The Army of Terror and whose home town is in ISIL held Syria, stated in a Pentagon lecture on 11 March 2015, “Some people like that ISIL establishes law and order. Sunni populations do not want Shia militias operating on their soil, even to “free” them from ISIL. Therefore, ISIL is gaining support despite military defeats. It is strategically winning in part because there is no sustainable governance replacing it, and moderates are becoming weaker. In addition, no one says what will replace ISIL. Some say ISIL is crumbling (referencing a Washington Post Article by Liz Sly), but it is not.

The "Islamic State" and the #FutureOfWar

Why They Are a Junior Varsity Team

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When asked about the “Islamic State” last year (then referred to as ISIS), President Obama stated that, “if a jayvee team puts on Lakers uniforms that doesn’t make them Kobe Bryant.” After the Islamic State swiftly overtook Mosul and much of western Iraq last summer, media pundits and politicianscriticized the analogy. This essay argues the opposite, President Obama was absolutely correct in referring to the Islamic State as a “JV” team, and how policy makers conceptualize the world order and its threats has enormous implications for the future of war.

In order to conceptualize the future of war, one must understand the strategic setting (or world order). Nearly two decades ago, Barry Posen and Andrew Ross offered competing visions for U.S. national security by offering a typology for U.S. grand strategy, each with a preferred world order[1]. Instead, this essay suggests that grand strategy is not the driver of world order, but rather world order is the driver of grand strategy. Each strategic setting constructs a different type of world, with different centers of political, military, and economic power. The three scenarios in this thought experiment are: bipolarity (two antagonistic superpowers), unipolarity (one superpower) and multipolarity (multiple regional powers). These poles represent a “center of gravity” that strong nation-states generate with the weight of their economic, political and military systems.

…grand strategy is not the driver of world order, but…world order is the driver of grand strategy.

Scenario 1: Bipolar World

Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz and Robert Art argue that the bipolar world order is the most stable. According to the neorealist literature, bipolarity tends to be the preferred world order from the U.S. security perspective because total war is unlikely between two nuclear-armed states, and only a nuclear-armed state can rise to superpower status. Instead, wars in bipolar worlds are typically proxy wars fought on the edges of hegemonic influence. The proxy wars of the Cold War, most notably the Soviet incursion in Afghanistan and the U.S. incursion into Indochina, are typical of wars fought in a bipolar world. One superpower intervenes abroad, outside their sphere of influence, and the other tries to undercut their actions. If China were to emerge as a peer competitor this century, the U.S.’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ is a logical security strategy, as most of the proxy wars with China are likely to take place in the Pacific theater of operations (but not in China itself).

Conceptualization of a Bipolar Strategic Setting

One characteristic of a bipolar world order is that it gives smaller players on the world stage an alternative to the U.S. for alignment and security assistance. For instance, during the Cold War, Egypt balanced U.S. influence by alternating between Moscow and Washington for political sponsorship, military training, monetary benefits and arms procurement. If China, or even Russia, rises to the level of a peer-competitor, “mercurial allies,” such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) would be faced with a choice: either align with U.S. interests when seeking security assistance, or seek assistance from the other superpower.

Scenario 2: Unipolar World

The sun never set on the British Empire. (Wikispaces)

In the unipolar world, a single hegemon drives the world order, much like the Roman or British Empires did at their heights. Given the vast economic and military power of the U.S., some analysts suggest the global order for the next several decades will be unipolar. Certainly this was the general consensus after the collapse of the Soviet Union a quarter century ago. In this scenario, strategically speaking, the U.S. will have to resolve a major incongruity in the national political-military culture: distaste for imperial behavior, yet the desire to expand commercial enterprises and protect human rights abroad. Likewise, U.S. strategists will have to face an inherent paradox: every nation-state resents the hegemonic superpower, but every nation-state is seeking to become the hegemonic superpower.

The U.S. will have to resolve a major incongruity in the national political-military culture: distaste for imperial behavior, yet the desire to expand commercial enterprises and protect human rights abroad.

In this scenario, as the unipolar power, the U.S. will be called upon to intervene in regional conflicts. Without a clear national security strategy, U.S. policy makers will pick and choose battles in an ad hoc manner, administration by administration, driven by short-term political agendas. Yet, U.S. actions abroad will have unseen second and third order effects that will endure for decades and even centuries to come.

The realist would argue that as the unipolar power, the U.S. will naturally desire to retain supremacy and contain any potential peer competitors. Therefore, expansion of NATO and security of the Pacific would drive national strategy (consciously or not): NATO to contain a revisionist Russia and military presence in the Pacific to thwart Chinese aggression.

In this scenario, the U.S. can also intervene in smaller regional conflicts at will. But, what kinds of conflicts does the superpower face in a unipolar world? These are the same types of battles faced by the Roman and British Empires, and much like bipolar scenario, they will take place at the edge of the hegemonic influence. So, you can expect the U.S. to become involved in smaller regional conflicts around Russia’s borders, between Turkey and the Middle East, and around the Mediterranean and Pacific Rim.

Scenario 3: Multipolar World

In a multipolar world, there is no single superpower. Interdependence and transnational interests cloud the traditional notion of the “nation-state.” And, without strong nation-states to hold players accountable, there is a very high threat of everything from nuclear proliferation to cyber attacks from rogue organizations. Furthermore, cooperative security arrangements through multinational institutions mean priorities shift and change all over the world, all of the time.

...without strong nation-states to hold players accountable, there is a very high threat of everything from nuclear proliferation to cyber attacks…

A political realist could argue the emergence of the Islamic State today is a direct reflection of the fallout from a lopsided world order. Without Russia and the U.S. aggressively supporting the nation-state system and propping up regional powers, ungoverned spaces are left in a turbulent security vacuum. And, in an ominous foreshadowing of future events, Posen and Ross suggested “the organization of a global information system helps to connect these events by providing strategic intelligence to good guys and bad guys alike; it connects them politically by providing images of one horror after another in the living rooms of the citizens of economically advanced democracies”[ii].

According to Posen and Ross, a multipolar world begets multilateral operations. The U.S.’s contribution to military operations are typically where they have the most significant comparative advantage: aerospace power. Therefore, the future of war in a multipolar world sees the U.S. leading air campaigns against shifting enemies, mainly in failed states. Not only that, the U.S. will aggressively seek to maintain their comparative advantage in aerospace power.

Realists argue the multipolar world is the most chaotic. First, without a strong superpower to support smaller nation-states, smaller players cannot maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Weak and failed states tend to spew a plethora of competing factions, some with nefarious intentions. Second, the aggressors are unclear. Some factions are supported by regional hegemons, and others are simply trying to fill the power vacuum. Finally, the U.S.’s reliance on aerospace power makes U.S. forces even more vulnerable to asymmetric attacks. The non-state actor is unlikely to strike using conventional methods, so the battlefield is cast with ambiguous players, many of which are supported by regional hegemons.

Conclusion

*Quasi-nuclear denotes states with nuclear aspirations or undeclared nuclear capability

It is difficult to discern which world order is preeminent now, but it is possible the three world orders are not mutually exclusive, nor are they static conditions. Without a doubt, the U.S. has the world’s strongest economic and military systems, which suggests they are the lone superpower. Despite this, the world is actually experiencing many of the consequences derived from a multipolar world order. This is especially prominent in the Middle East, where regional hegemons are not officially nuclear states (although several of them have the capability and will to go nuclear). So, perhaps the best way to conceptualize the world order is unipolarity in locations closest to the U.S. and elements of multipolarity in distant locations with regional hegemons. Despite their differences, unipolarity and multipolarity both suggest that the future of war will be fought on the fringes of U.S. influence, against smaller and more agile adversaries- some of which have the ability to strike the U.S. homeland, many that are getting support from a regional hegemon, and most of which are the excrescence of a failed state. This is exactly why the Islamic State is a “JV” team. At this time, the Islamic State neither has the resources nor the capability to achieve the hegemony that comes with nuclear power and projection; they are simply a satellite of a larger hegemon. The U.S.’s response to the Islamic State typifies the future of war in a multipolar world: broad coalitions and the use of aerospace power against disparate organizations.

…the future of war will be fought on the fringes of U.S. influence, against smaller and more agile adversaries…

The main issue for U.S. policy makers is not from the chaos surrounding terrorist organizations like the Islamic State. Too much time and attention has been placed on this foe while ignoring much more important issues. For instance, global conditions are going to force the Department of Defense to place the primacy on maintaining air superiority, yet many conflicts of the near future will require the techniques of agile, flexible, and rapidly-adaptable fighters. It is very important to have a force structure designed for the threats it will face. Another issue will be how the global balance of power shifts if Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, or Israel becomes a declared nuclear state. If just one of these states goes nuclear (officially), it is highly likely to set off an arms race in the Middle East. More importantly, recent incursions into Crimea and Ukraine demonstrate that President Putin is intent on implementing his revisionist agenda. Given that Russia is a nuclear power and the proximity of Ukraine to NATO allies, this is the biggest threat to U.S. security interests. But, even more dramatic and uncertain will be if a non-state actor is to acquire a nuclear weapon. U.S. policy makers will no longer be dealing with a JV team if the Islamic State (or any other terrorist organization) was to obtain a “loose nuke.” To use a sports analogy, it will be the equivalent of a JV high school basketball team having LeBron James in the starting lineup: they are probably going to win a few games against older and more experienced teams.

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Diane Maye is a former Air Force officer, defense industry professional, and academic. She is a PhD candidate in Political Science at George Mason University where she studies Iraqi politics. She is a proud associate member of the Military Writers Guild. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.

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Notes:

[1] Posen, Barry and Andrew Ross. “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy” International Security 21:3 (Winter 1996/7): 6.

[2] Ibid, 25.

Fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

My Take: Authorization for Use of Military Force

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The debate regarding an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is in the forefront of the media this week. Since I began blogging in September of last year, I have written an assessment of the threat ISIL poses to the United States, suggested that foreign policy regarding ISIL be focused on behavior vice group name, and advocated for Congress to establish a strategic planning requirement when the men and women of our Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities. Below is my AUMF for ISIL, reflecting ideas established and refined in previous blog posts, overlayed onto how I think the U.S. should participate in this fight.

Below is my AUMF for ISIL, reflecting ideas established and refined in previous blog posts, overlayed onto how I think the U.S. should participate in this fight.

To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria.

Whereas the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria are committing daily acts of barbarity, pose a threat to the United States and the international community, and to support United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2169 (2014) and 2170 (2014), therefore be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:

JOINT RESOLUTION

To authorize use of the United States Armed Forces against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

This joint resolution may be cited as the ‘‘Authorization for Use of Military Force against the Violent Extremist Groups and Individuals Seeking to Establish an Independent State within the Territorial Limits of Iraq and Syria.”

SECTION 2. REPEAL OF AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ

The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–243; 116 Stat. 1498; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) is hereby repealed.

SECTION 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES

(a) AUTHORIZATION. The President is authorized, as part of a multinational coalition, subject to the limitations in subsection (c), to use the United States Armed Forces against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria.

(b) EXPIRATION. The authorization in this section shall expire on the date that is three years after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution.

(c) LIMITATIONS.

(1) The authority granted in subsection (a) does not authorize use of the United States Armed Forces in direct ground combat in except as necessary for the protection or rescue of United States military members and executive branch employees and contractors, or United States citizens, from imminent danger posed by the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria.

(2) The authority granted in subsection (a) does not authorize the United States Armed Forces to accompany any force or individual, on the ground, engaged in direct ground combat against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria.

(3) The authority granted in subsection (a) does not authorize the physical presence of the United States Armed Forces inside Syria except to conduct offensive air operations against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria or to rescue isolated personnel involved in activities against the same.

(d) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.

(1) Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1547(a)(1)), Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1544(b)) within the limits of the authorization established under this section.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS. Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.).

SECTION 4. REPORTS

(a) PERIODIC REPORT. The President shall report to Congress at least once every 60 days on specific actions taken pursuant to this authorization.

(b) COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY. Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution, the President shall submit to Congress an unclassified report, which may include a classified annex, on the comprehensive strategy to address the threat posed by the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria. This comprehensive strategy shall be presented in a manner similar to the agency strategic planning requirements established in section 306 of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–352).

SECTION 5. DEFINITIONS

(a) Violent Extremist means someone who uses violence to further ideas that are very far from what most people consider correct or reasonable.

(b) Direct Ground Combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with individual and crew served weapons while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel.

(c) Isolated Personnel are United States military members and executive branch employees and contractors, United States citizens, or multinational coalition personnel who are separated from their unit (as an individual or a group) while participating in an activity against groups and individuals using violent extremism to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria, and are, or may be, in a situation where they must survive, evade, resist, or escape.

SECTION 6. APPLICABILITY

The President’s authority to use the United States Armed Forces against the violent extremist groups and individuals seeking to establish an independent state within the territorial limits of Iraq and Syria is wholly contained within this joint resolution.

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Phil Walter has served in the military, the intelligence community, and the inter-agency. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not contain information of an official nature. He tweets @philwalter1058 and blogs at www.philwalter1058.com.

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